Sawsan311
Chemical
- Jun 21, 2019
- 303
Dear All,
API 2000 highlights the requirement of inbreathing rates which are directly reflected in sizing the vacuum safety valves (or PVSVs) or atmospheric open vents. At the same time, API 2000 highlights that flame arrestors can be used on open vents or at the inlet of PVSVs to protect from the consequence of internal deflagration/flashback in presence of flammable mixture and propagation of external ignition flame (such as lightening strike). At the same time, API 2000 (section 3.5.2) highlights the risks of compromising overpressure and under pressure protection in case flame arrestor gets blocked. Inert gas blanketing is a mitigation measure for reducing the flammability range of the tank's mixture and is preferably provided close to the nozzle of the VSVs (to minimize the oxygen content). Yet, no credit is taken for inert gas blanketing as a substitute to a properly sized VSV or open vent.
Annexure F of API 2000 sheds the light on three different levels of blanketing depending on the design measures installed for protection against underpressure and consequences of flashback:
Level 1
Inert gas rate= 10% of thermal inbreathing rate+ Pump Out capacity
Requires alarm activation when VSV activates.
Requires flame arrestor.
Hazardeous area zone 1 is given for the tank.
Level 2
Inert gas rate= 20% of thermal inbreathing rate+ Pump Out capacity.
Same as level 1.
Requires tripping the pump when the alarm of VSV activates.
Hazardeous area zone 2 is given for the tank.
Level 3
Inert gas rate= 50% of thermal inbreathing rate+ Pump Out capacity.
No flame arrester required.
Redundancy requirement for the pressure monitoring system which is activated to maintain the tank pressure always above the atmospheric pressure.
Pump tripping required at set pressure above the tank's atmospheric pressure with an alarm.
Hazardeous area zone 2 is given for the tank.
I have the following observations and I am seeking your views on the same:
1- comparing level 1 & level 2, level 2 involves shutdown of the pump in case of reaching the set point of the VSV unlike level -1 which triggers an alarm when VSV set point is reached. In your opinion, what makes level 1 more relaxed with respect to requiring less inert gas blanketing?
2- I find it difficult to accept considering as part of design, open vents with flame arrestors installed on hydrocarbon storage tanks without inert gas blanketing. In some site conditions, it will be very challenging to secure the amount of nitrogen blanketing, required even by Annex F of API 2000. Additionally, the risks of nitrogen vent required introduces additional dispersion design requirements to route the vent to safe location.
Therefore, do you find it safe to install flame arrestors on a fixed roof atmospheric hydrocarbon storage tank without any nitrogen blanketing and without any VSV? In my opinion, at least two flame arrestors shall be available to ensure at least one is maintained without risk of blockage. However, it would be still dangerous to allow air to ingress through the tank's open vent and continuously having a flammable HC mixture in comparison when blanketing is there.
3- Even if the designer considers VSV for vacuum protection besides flame arrestor, not providing inert gas blanketing may sound to be a design deficit because air is allowed to be introduced through the VSV when activated without any mitigating measure for reducing the extent of flammability of the tnk's contents.
4- could it be common design to consider only flame arrestors on atmospheric HC tanks with / without VSVs with absence of blanketing system.
Appreciate your technical views.
Regards,
API 2000 highlights the requirement of inbreathing rates which are directly reflected in sizing the vacuum safety valves (or PVSVs) or atmospheric open vents. At the same time, API 2000 highlights that flame arrestors can be used on open vents or at the inlet of PVSVs to protect from the consequence of internal deflagration/flashback in presence of flammable mixture and propagation of external ignition flame (such as lightening strike). At the same time, API 2000 (section 3.5.2) highlights the risks of compromising overpressure and under pressure protection in case flame arrestor gets blocked. Inert gas blanketing is a mitigation measure for reducing the flammability range of the tank's mixture and is preferably provided close to the nozzle of the VSVs (to minimize the oxygen content). Yet, no credit is taken for inert gas blanketing as a substitute to a properly sized VSV or open vent.
Annexure F of API 2000 sheds the light on three different levels of blanketing depending on the design measures installed for protection against underpressure and consequences of flashback:
Level 1
Inert gas rate= 10% of thermal inbreathing rate+ Pump Out capacity
Requires alarm activation when VSV activates.
Requires flame arrestor.
Hazardeous area zone 1 is given for the tank.
Level 2
Inert gas rate= 20% of thermal inbreathing rate+ Pump Out capacity.
Same as level 1.
Requires tripping the pump when the alarm of VSV activates.
Hazardeous area zone 2 is given for the tank.
Level 3
Inert gas rate= 50% of thermal inbreathing rate+ Pump Out capacity.
No flame arrester required.
Redundancy requirement for the pressure monitoring system which is activated to maintain the tank pressure always above the atmospheric pressure.
Pump tripping required at set pressure above the tank's atmospheric pressure with an alarm.
Hazardeous area zone 2 is given for the tank.
I have the following observations and I am seeking your views on the same:
1- comparing level 1 & level 2, level 2 involves shutdown of the pump in case of reaching the set point of the VSV unlike level -1 which triggers an alarm when VSV set point is reached. In your opinion, what makes level 1 more relaxed with respect to requiring less inert gas blanketing?
2- I find it difficult to accept considering as part of design, open vents with flame arrestors installed on hydrocarbon storage tanks without inert gas blanketing. In some site conditions, it will be very challenging to secure the amount of nitrogen blanketing, required even by Annex F of API 2000. Additionally, the risks of nitrogen vent required introduces additional dispersion design requirements to route the vent to safe location.
Therefore, do you find it safe to install flame arrestors on a fixed roof atmospheric hydrocarbon storage tank without any nitrogen blanketing and without any VSV? In my opinion, at least two flame arrestors shall be available to ensure at least one is maintained without risk of blockage. However, it would be still dangerous to allow air to ingress through the tank's open vent and continuously having a flammable HC mixture in comparison when blanketing is there.
3- Even if the designer considers VSV for vacuum protection besides flame arrestor, not providing inert gas blanketing may sound to be a design deficit because air is allowed to be introduced through the VSV when activated without any mitigating measure for reducing the extent of flammability of the tnk's contents.
4- could it be common design to consider only flame arrestors on atmospheric HC tanks with / without VSVs with absence of blanketing system.
Appreciate your technical views.
Regards,
