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1. On Dec. 20, 2008 a Continental AL B737 veered off the runway at Denver IA. The aircraft was a total loss but thankfully there were only a few minor injuries. The tower informed the crew that the crosswind was 31-MPH… but failed to inform the crew of crosswind gusts up-to 46-mph in the previous few minutes… which exceeded the B737 crosswind limit of 38-mph. Without this info, the crew elected to take off… and had no insight that dangerous cross-wind gust conditions could be present. NTSB Findings revealed a crosswind gust of close to 52-MPH during take-off roll grossly affected aircraft controllability. The pilot had roughly 4-seconds to make effective control movements before controllability was totally lost… didn't happen and the jet went off the side of the runway into shallow gully. I suspect that icy conditions played a part ... perhaps reducing traction … but also minimizing fire/explosion potential off-runway.
2. A Falcon 20 [or 10?] nose LDG tire was over-inflated and failed in a hangar. Appears the mechanic was confused by metric-pressure maintenance instructions, while using PSI measurements.
NOTE: the mechanic had his back to the tire [wasn't watching the operations... thank God???] when it burst. It looks like a piece of the tire carcass hit him in the back. The opposite side [RH?] tire/wheel blew off the axle and went rolling away across the hangar floor. It is unclear whether any of the other [closely parked] jets were damaged with debris.
3. The RAF Nimrod MR2 crash in Afghanistan 2006 was the result of a fuel leak just minutes after AR. The following mishap review/report might be very interesting to read. Lot of issues with the OEM and other organizations created the mishap chain of events.
From…
THE NIMROD REVIEW
An independent review into the broader issues
surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2
Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006.
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
RAF Board of Inquiry
1.5 The Board of Inquiry (BOI) presented its Report to the Convening Authority (AOC2 Group) on 20 April 2007. An
Addendum to the Report was issued on 25 July 2007. The Board’s findings were made public on 4 December
2007.
1.6 The BOI concluded that the loss of XV230 was caused by:
1.6.1 Fuel Source: The escape of fuel during Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR), occasioned by an overflow from
the blow-off valve to No. 1 tank, causing fuel to track back along the fuselage, or alternatively, a leak
of fuel from the fuel system (fuel coupling or pipe), leading to an accumulation of fuel within the No.
7 Tank Dry Bay. Although of a lower probability, the fuel leak could have been caused by a hot air leak
damaging fuel system seals; and
1.6.2 Ignition Source: The ignition of that fuel following contact with an exposed element of the aircraft’s
Cross-Feed/Supplementary Cooling Pack (SCP) duct.
1.7 The BOI found that fuel was most likely to have accumulated in the Refrasil insulation muff around the SCP
elbow at the bottom of the starboard No. 7 Tank Dry Bay. The BOI also found that a ‘Safety Case’ prepared
in respect of the Nimrod MR1 and MR2 aircraft between 2002 and 2005, the Nimrod Safety Case, contained
a number of significant errors. It was not within the BOI’s remit to consider, or attribute, responsibility for the
accident. I analyze the Board of Inquiry’s findings in detail in Chapter 3.
NOTE: there is a deeper exec-summary later-on in Chapter 1, that has some very interesting criticisms spread between the Hawker-Siddeley/BAE the RAF and the MOD etc.
The total report is fairly extensive/exhaustive @587pages.
4. Follow the link below for an excellent monthly aircraft maintenance technician publication… must read for liaison engineers and others who work related maintenance issues.
Go to and "click" on the magazine front page.
I think this link is good for the "most current" issue of the AMT magazine… so keep informed!
Regards, Wil Taylor
2. A Falcon 20 [or 10?] nose LDG tire was over-inflated and failed in a hangar. Appears the mechanic was confused by metric-pressure maintenance instructions, while using PSI measurements.
NOTE: the mechanic had his back to the tire [wasn't watching the operations... thank God???] when it burst. It looks like a piece of the tire carcass hit him in the back. The opposite side [RH?] tire/wheel blew off the axle and went rolling away across the hangar floor. It is unclear whether any of the other [closely parked] jets were damaged with debris.
3. The RAF Nimrod MR2 crash in Afghanistan 2006 was the result of a fuel leak just minutes after AR. The following mishap review/report might be very interesting to read. Lot of issues with the OEM and other organizations created the mishap chain of events.
From…
THE NIMROD REVIEW
An independent review into the broader issues
surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2
Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006.
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
RAF Board of Inquiry
1.5 The Board of Inquiry (BOI) presented its Report to the Convening Authority (AOC2 Group) on 20 April 2007. An
Addendum to the Report was issued on 25 July 2007. The Board’s findings were made public on 4 December
2007.
1.6 The BOI concluded that the loss of XV230 was caused by:
1.6.1 Fuel Source: The escape of fuel during Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR), occasioned by an overflow from
the blow-off valve to No. 1 tank, causing fuel to track back along the fuselage, or alternatively, a leak
of fuel from the fuel system (fuel coupling or pipe), leading to an accumulation of fuel within the No.
7 Tank Dry Bay. Although of a lower probability, the fuel leak could have been caused by a hot air leak
damaging fuel system seals; and
1.6.2 Ignition Source: The ignition of that fuel following contact with an exposed element of the aircraft’s
Cross-Feed/Supplementary Cooling Pack (SCP) duct.
1.7 The BOI found that fuel was most likely to have accumulated in the Refrasil insulation muff around the SCP
elbow at the bottom of the starboard No. 7 Tank Dry Bay. The BOI also found that a ‘Safety Case’ prepared
in respect of the Nimrod MR1 and MR2 aircraft between 2002 and 2005, the Nimrod Safety Case, contained
a number of significant errors. It was not within the BOI’s remit to consider, or attribute, responsibility for the
accident. I analyze the Board of Inquiry’s findings in detail in Chapter 3.
NOTE: there is a deeper exec-summary later-on in Chapter 1, that has some very interesting criticisms spread between the Hawker-Siddeley/BAE the RAF and the MOD etc.
The total report is fairly extensive/exhaustive @587pages.
4. Follow the link below for an excellent monthly aircraft maintenance technician publication… must read for liaison engineers and others who work related maintenance issues.
Go to and "click" on the magazine front page.
I think this link is good for the "most current" issue of the AMT magazine… so keep informed!
Regards, Wil Taylor
