Argentine grid collapse in Jun'19 2

[RRaghunath]

Has anyone seen the report copy??
I am aware there was fault in one of 500kV lines which triggered the event. But, as we all know from experience such major disruptions involve more than one failure at ground level.
I am curious to have the lessons that the event could offer to us, protection engineers.

 

[erdep]

This is a official report (in Spanish).

 

[cuky2000]

Below is a summary update of the Argentinian blackout on 6/16/19.
This cost a sizable fine of $AR400M ($US9.4M)to T. Line operator, Transener.
The main issue is attributed that Transener forgot or improper re-sett the relay system after performing a physical bypass in one of the 500 kV parallel lines that were out of service prior to the SC event.
Hope this help.

 

[RRaghunath]

erdep, Thanks.
How can I get English copy without spending for translation!

 

[RRaghunath]

Cuky2000, I guess when there was fault in the subject 500kV OHL, circuit breakers at Colonia & Belgrano tripped but, Campana circuit breaker remained closed. This would have resulted in uncleared fault in the power system, causing the trip of Compana-Rodriguez line back up protection operated. It is likely Busbar trip happened at Compana on BF protection initiation.
As the picture indicates the load on the Colonia-Belgrano-Campana line was 1650MW, prior to the event. Even if protection is correctly configured and fault is cleared as designed, could the power system have withstood trip of a line carrying such huge amount of power??

 

[Sn00ze]

Sounds like they added a By-pass during a previous SC event which involved disabling the DAG (Disengagement automatic of Generation) which would disconnect in an automatic/smart way generation in order to achieve normal operating frequency. Without this, The fault cascaded to BF adjacent plants and islanding others. This contributed to the fault which eventually collapsed the system.

 

[cuky2000]

Hi RRaghunth,

Reading the report appears the line breaker at Colonia & Belgrano cleared the fault but the large generators did not detect this scenario on time to ramping down remaining in service until eventually tripped out probably by Overspeed of the units.
As indicated in the report:

There are a few vague statements on the report that make difficult to know the specific detail of the cause of the blackout post the SLG fault on the T. Line. Not sure if those long lines have series compensation and how the load is reconfigured after loss a large generation sources.

Appear to me that suddenly disconnecting a large load even with both lines in service, the system will be facing a great challenger to remain in service. With only one line in service, I was not surprised that the system collapsed.

Below is an attent to translate the sequence of the event described.

 

[Mbrooke]

Thanks everyone for the links- great reads.

 

[erdep]

The English translation