rb1957
Aerospace
- Apr 15, 2005
- 15,752
i don't know that you can blame all RT resin systems .... Fokker have used RT resins for decades, without problems. in my experience, it it the process compliance that is the root of the problems. Boeing now uses a much better (reliable) systeem (PAA) and much tighter process controls.
the best thing that can be said about SW is that 1st no-one died, and 2nd this is probably the most highly stressed (certainly most highly loaded) part of the fuselage. Interestingly the failure happened without max cabin pressure.
i'd add to the previous posts (noting that i'm not particularly a Boeing fan) that we're looking at an airplane designed 50 years ago and it has stood up pretty well to that experience. it was designed before damage tolerance, and in the early days of fatigue; fail safe was in it's infancy.
the Aloha incident was a combination of errors (as all incidents are) ... the basic design was possibly suspect, the maintenance was not complete (not through negligence), the certification was questionable. this produced the aging aircraft re-cert program, highlighting the (possibly obvious) interconnection between OEM, maintainer, and certiication. remember too that this design is early in the development of mandatory structural inspections, and operators had to understand the importance of these.
In-service usage would be closely monitored by Boeing; yes, each operator is different to the certification spectrum, but their operations are assessed (by Boeing or by themselves) to ensure that the correct assessment of fatigue effects (again, fall-out from Aloha).
the best thing that can be said about SW is that 1st no-one died, and 2nd this is probably the most highly stressed (certainly most highly loaded) part of the fuselage. Interestingly the failure happened without max cabin pressure.
i'd add to the previous posts (noting that i'm not particularly a Boeing fan) that we're looking at an airplane designed 50 years ago and it has stood up pretty well to that experience. it was designed before damage tolerance, and in the early days of fatigue; fail safe was in it's infancy.
the Aloha incident was a combination of errors (as all incidents are) ... the basic design was possibly suspect, the maintenance was not complete (not through negligence), the certification was questionable. this produced the aging aircraft re-cert program, highlighting the (possibly obvious) interconnection between OEM, maintainer, and certiication. remember too that this design is early in the development of mandatory structural inspections, and operators had to understand the importance of these.
In-service usage would be closely monitored by Boeing; yes, each operator is different to the certification spectrum, but their operations are assessed (by Boeing or by themselves) to ensure that the correct assessment of fatigue effects (again, fall-out from Aloha).