Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 19 27

[SFCharlie]

A continuation of our discussion of this failure. Best to read the other threads first to avoid rehashing things already discussed.
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 02
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 03
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 04
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 05
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 06
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 07
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 08
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 09
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 10
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 11
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 12
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 13
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 14
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 15
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 16
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 17
Miami Beach, Champlain Towers South apartment building collapse, Part 18

 

[NOLAscience]

At a more temporal level, the collapse is about inept renovations that overloaded a suspended slab, inept engineering studies evaluating a failing structure, and a failure to rein in usage of a hazardous space, i.e., the lobby-level parking whose compromised structural integrity was well documented years earlier, even up to the weeks prior to collapse.

The design of the structural slab was modified during construction from a beam-shape to a flat slab only, and this change is the source of the problems with ponding, cracking, etc. This was the original cause. Now, 40 years later, the proximal cause of the collapse (or, at least, the deaths due to the collapse) is the unwillingness to evacuate the building when these problems persisted, regardless of any 'repairs'. I will admit that it wasn't a quick process to pick out this change or its effect on the design -- we were discussing the plans and revisions for a few weeks before one of the engineers here pointed out the change. (Complicated designs are harder to check. I blame the architects, at least partially, for their overly complicated design and, perhaps, asking to remove the 'step-down' at this beam-slab.) The last (only?) engineer who was asked to provide repair solutions should have been directed to review the original permitted plans and revised plans IN THE AREA OF THE ponding, etc. The building's HOA board should have requested this directly -- or found an experienced high-rise engineer to review.

All other 'causes' are more like dominos that fall after the first one is tipped over.