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Pipeline damage/failure root cause 1

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Mahmoud Khalaf

Petroleum
Aug 7, 2021
26
0
0
EG
Hello everyone,

I work in an upstream oil and gas site in Egypt.
Recently, 18 months ago, we introduced into service a new 2 phase crude oil 12" subsea carbon steel pipeline run from a gathering platform of nearly 40 meter water depth to the onshore oil terminal process.
The pipeline designed to the DNV-F101-OS offshore standard and the subsea installation carried out through the S lay barge.
Unfortunately, Three weeks ago, we have an oil spell over the line, we got forced with unplanned shutdown and switch over the production stream to another 3phase 20" pipeline.

The divers did finally catch four leakage points / ruptures observed sequentially after repetitive hydrotests.
The ruptures located at different distances apart from each others, the initial investigation showed nearly a same configuration for the rupture defects @ weld HAZ area.
The welding process at the barge got strictly controlled through three fully supervised welding inspectors that followed the DNV code instructions, hence we fairly exclude a sharp welding defect that emerges repeatidely nearly at the same locations relative to the girth welds, both axially (@the HAZ) and circumferentially (nearly the same O'clock side)

By the way, after completing the successful hydrotest and geometry pig, the pipeline got preserved about 6 months before introducing into operation with a doubt in the efficiency and control of the presevation process.

On the other hand, few months ago, the onshore section connected to this subsea pipeline has suffered a lateral movement of about 1.5 meter over the resting concrete supports that caused a damage observed for the pig trap supports.
We,here, guess that operation surges might cause the damage shown at the onshore section and hidden at the offshore subsea one. I guess that the heavy concrete coating the subsea section preclude its lateral movement, and initiate a huge fatigue stresses that released in a rupture form.

At the same time, the line convey two phase crude of %70 water cut with a relatively low flow speed, and the corrosion of the internal surface might accelerate heavily but how we could believe that corrosion leads quickly to this catastrophic failure.

We are planning to call an experienced third party to present an engineering failure root cause analysis to stand on the most likely failure reason and help support Safe future operation.

Also, we have to garantee all the following conditions together:
- Assure the pipeline integrity via confirming no other severe cracks left in the line after doing pigging using the compo tethered solution including both crack detection (TOFD technique) and corrosion detection technique.
- Confirm the failure root cause analysis to assure future Safe and reliable operation without the repeat of this catastrophic failure.

Finally, I would be grateful if someone advise the potential failure root causes that might be relevant to this kind of catastrophic failure.
 
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Reply to Mr. blacksmith37 (Materials):
Depending on total pressure , 200 ppm H2S can cause sulfide SCC of hard weld HAZ; that would be the first place I looked.

-From this point of view, I wouldn't think in the HAZ SCC, as the pipeline operating pressure doesn't exceed the 6 or 7 bar of the 40 bar pipeline design pressure, hence the generating hoop stress is so low to promote the SCC.
It value doesn't touch even the %30 of the SMYS.
 
Reply to Mr. SJones (Petroleum):

Did the "corrosion inhibitor management" include assessment of the propensity for the inhibitor to cause preferential weld corrosion? The weld metal composition is also an interlinked parameter.

-At the beginning, i got suspect in the selective girth weld corrosion as the defects repeated in the same locations (HAZ) relative to the girth welds, but again how did they failed nearly at the same time and looks like ruptures not corrosion.
Anyway way, I think the corrosion inhibitor management has not been planned to target such specific defect.
Also, there are other crude oil pipelines that interconnect the wellhead platforms to the production platform transferring the same crude, have been operating for nearly 40 years, since day one operation, and were not reported to suffer specifically from such kind of defects.
 
@Mahmoud Khalaf - regarding stress at the welds: don't forget the weld zone will have residual stress irrespective of hoop stress. Typically, the stress is taken to approximate the yield stress of the material.

Unless each WHP is supplying identical crude, the fluid in the export pipeline could be considerably different after processing and commingling.

Steve Jones
Corrosion Management Consultant


All answers are personal opinions only and are in no way connected with any employer.
 
@SJones
The effect of HAZ residual stress would promote cracking when welding conditions support this.
But our case, we have mild steel grade X52 of very low carbon content and small wall thickness of 9.5 mm sch.40 pipes at all leakage/rupture locations. Those with accompanied qualified WPS insure slow cooling rate with slow heat dissipation process that doesn't require PWHT.

What do you mean with:
Typically, the stress is taken to approximate the yield stress of the material.

Thanks for your cooperation.
 
@Mr. Steve
Thanks for attaching such relevant and important technical paper.
I will read it soon to pick such relevant issues.
Again, highly appreciate your cooperation.
 
Mahmoud Khalaf,
H2S PPM level don't decide on requirement of NACE material. The main criteria that decides NACE material usage are:
1. Partial pressure of H2S. Is it more than 0.05 psia (0.3 kPa)?
2. In situ acidity PH value of the water phase.
3. Chlorine ion concentration in the water phase.
4. Exposure temperature, time
5. Total tensile load (applied and residual).

You had submitted couple of information for above.
The EPC company must have done a due diligence and evaluated the process conditions while designing the pipeline but you never know. Knowing the H2S partial pressure might probably give a pointer to whether NACE compliance was required.



GDD
Canada
 
@GDD
Thanks alot 👍 for your thorough engineering comments.

I did suppose that the pipeline design had referencd NACE compliance as all site precess offshore and onshore pressure vessels were actually designed to comply with NACE requirements for sour service.
But, now, I don't suppose that compliance considered in the pipeline design neither for this new line nor for the old one.

I think that EPC company ( by the way, they are two the first for engineering and procurement and the second for construction) wouldn't have considered this compliance even they would receive such required information/data.

The above is for organizational point of view while from technical point of view, i would present some inquiries:

The five requirements you have previously introduced to force such compliance, they have to be included together or just one requirement could force such compliance? I think they have to be included all together.(I just guess, otherwise, i have to check the standard)

Anyway, I will search for other available information you have mentioned above.

Thanks again.



 
@Mr. Steve

I have quickly browsed the relevant technical paper you have recently attended but shurely, it needs much time to study and well recognize it's invaluable content.

Really it focuses on a critical parameter (residual stress effects) that should be profoundly considered and controlled during structural project engineering and construction phase.
We agree on the adverse effect of residual stress on the weld joints integrity and it needs measurements to stand on its approximated values as the study states the higher residual stress magnitudes that could approach the material yield strength itself.

But, again, I would inquire that our case might be relatively different when compared with the weld joints mentioned in the study for the following reasons:

- in our case, the pipeline has less wallthickness (9.5 mm) than both joints mentioned in the study (19 mmm for the 16" joint and 22 mm for the 20" joint), this will reflect less material cross section and volume that leads to slower cooling rate and heat dissipation as well, as you know the heat conductivity is at its highest rate through the metal cross section. This mandates PWHT requirements for higher wallthickness weldments to metigate the adverse effects of residual stresses.

- Also, the pipeline material is API 5LX52 which is less in its yield and tensile strength values compared to both the two weld joints X65 and X70 mentioned in the study, this leads to easier weldability for X52 pipe and less residual stress relevant to its less carbon content.

Highly appreciate your cooperation.

 
I have performed a number of audits of X52 pipe tensile properties and over 80% met or exceeed X60 tensile properties. I remember a similar failure with an underwater line in sour service where the pipe was specified as X42 but tensile properties were close to meeting X60 and CE was not controlled. I always wrote specs controlling chemistry of X42 and X52 for pipe in sour service.
 
@ weldstan (material)

Firstly, thanks for your comment.
I think you get broaden the uncertainty domain of the parameters relevant to this pipeline failure case.

But, as stated in your audit results which concludes that a major percentage of the mill produced pipes for defined steel grades are actually more relevant to a higher strength grade, then if your results would be presented in a tight study parameters that statistically valid, in my opinion, this would introduce some inquiries:

- The QC level for material specification should be reviewed in the steel mill to insure accurate and approved acceptance criteria regarding this issue, as this would introduce adverse effects in relation to residual stress and carbon content control for the welding joints.

- Based on your results, and if many literaturally published studies would well state and approve such results, it might be introduced as an ASME/DNV code case that might recommend PWHT as a conservative procedure to mitigate such adverse effects of residual stresses and uncontrolled carbon content for defined steel grades, at least, for such critical/costly industries.

Unfortunately the concequences in subsea pipeline failure is unaffordable as just one uncontrolled welding joint or unconsidered process parameter could initiate the failure even in one location, this usually forces costly production down time and costly repair procedure.
 
The five requirements you have previously introduced to force such compliance, they have to be included together or just one requirement could force such compliance? I think they have to be included all together.(I just guess, otherwise, i have to check the standard).

Mahmoud,
All the factors I mentioned contribute to an environment for the diffusion of atomic hydrogen into the metal leading to SCC/SSC.

One thing I am wondering is why the cracks are all at 0 O'Clock position.

GDD
Canada
 
Steel mills are out to make the greatest profit and have increasingly made steels marked with multiple specs and grades thereof. Because steels are purchased from numerous mills in numerous countries with differing steel making philosophies, it is imperative that the end user understand just what is required for the service conditions and generate controling specifications that refflect that service. Unfortunately this is often not so.
 
@ GDD

One thing I am wondering is why the cracks are all at 0 O'Clock position.

No. I didn't mention that, refer to the main thread, I mentioned the same O'Clock not 0 o'Clock position.

Anyway, the divers vedios reported the 6 O'Clock position; definitely, three locations at 6 O'Clock and the fourth location at nearly 4 O'Clock.

Here i think this might strengthen your guess of SCC/SSC at pipeline bottom surface where microbiological deposites settle?
 
Mahmoud,
Another question that should have been asked before is was the API5LX52 pipes PSL1 or PSL2? By what you said so far I would guess it is PSL1.

GDD
Canada
 
@GDD
The line pipe spec. as requested by the Engineering company was PLS2.
Iam trying to find the MTR of the purchased line pipe received from steel mill.

Note:
In the attachment, the bottom green mark/arrow refer to No Sour as supplementary requirements of the line pipe specification sheet!!

update: iam trying to attach the document.
 
Mahmoud Khalaf said:
Also, the pipeline material is API 5LX52 which is less in its yield and tensile strength values compared to both the two weld joints X65 and X70 mentioned in the study, this leads to easier weldability for X52 pipe and less residual stress relevant to its less carbon content

For residual stress estimation in your case, why not complete a calculation using the formula in clause 11 of the UK HSE report? You will note that has no dependency on pipe grade, carbon equivalent etc.

[URL unfurl="true"]https://res.cloudinary.com/engineering-com/image/upload/v1630578636/tips/Residual_Stress_ip0y7s.pdf[/url]

Steve Jones
Corrosion Management Consultant


All answers are personal opinions only and are in no way connected with any employer.
 
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