They obviously sold on some liability. Plains was quick to note that they purchased it from a "3rd party". I think a lesson for pipeline companies is don't buy them from "3rd parties" unless you accept the risk and responsibilities that go along with them, do the due diligence, inspect them, inside and out, retest them and, of course, operate them responsibly. It will be interesting to see how much of that was actually done before they took over operations.
And ... "One of the big surprises to emerge out of the most dramatic oil spill to hit the South Coast this century is that the Plains All American Pipeline is the only pipeline in all of Santa Barbara County not to have an automatic shut-off valve. Not coincidentally, it happens to be the only pipeline over which the County Energy Division has no safety and inspection oversight authority."
Big Inch,
At time of typing this the reason for the leak had not been ascertained.
Just wonder what your thoughts are on weld acceptance criterias (I noted in the stories about the refusal of the owner to allow review of radiographs by regulatory bodies)
As an ex radiographer who has worked on a lot of API 1104 (pipelines) and B31.3 (refineries) I have always wondered why API 1104 is much less stringent than B31.3 when generally it is same product at same pressures but one is above ground and one is buried.
Always thought that it was the coverage of the pipe by a lot of dirt that allowed the lesser acceptance criteria.
Is there any data on the numbers in the US on reported pipeline incidents - failure due to corrosion, failure due to mechanical damage or failure due to weld defects ?
Cheers,
DD
Dirt doesn't matter too much one way or another. There's a lot of reasons why criteria are different between codes. Pipelines are usually only subject to ambient temperatures, B31.3 pipe might go to several hundred degrees, however that's not to say that in particular circumstances you shouldn't or couldn't use the more conservative provisions of either or any code, or RP, standard, or your personal experience. Codes, standards and RPs are dangerous in that regard, as those idiots that do manage to read them from time to time say, "that's ALL that we have to do. Says so right there". Why is that. Because that's the only reason idiots read the codes at all. Codes should always be interpreted as minimum criteria.
PHMSA maintains a website where "pipeline incidents" and their causes are listed.
Whenever I think that there are enough regulations, some irresponsible operator proves me wrong.
IMO More CEOs, engineers and operators need to be held personally responsible for these things.
It is not sufficient for shareholders to pay (or usually avoid) fines. Some countries now lock these guys up first then sort it out later.
I am not intending to prescribe blame to the innocent not proven guilty in this case. Just stating some general prudent operating practices and procedures that I am hopeful, and reasonably confident will eventually see, were followed prior to handover of this particular pipeline.
BI,
If the same product at the same pressure and the same temperature is travelling through the same pipe, why is it then going from different jurisdictions (API / B31.3) with different acceptance criterias ?
Not expecting you to answer - just wondering ?
It doesn't bother me as I live on the Thai / Cambodian border in the middle of nowhere but if I was a US citizen living in close proximity to a pipeline I would want to be confident of that pipelines integrity.
We used to joke when I was welding on pipelines in NZ that we would never buy a house on or near the pipeline "spread".
Food for thought ?
Cheers,
DD
The controlled environment of a refinery with respect to process and pipe is very much different from the highly uncontrolled environment surrounding a pipeline. Similar to the like of difference between criteria for indoors and outdoors construction of wooden items, or electrical fixtures. Welding. Pipeline welding needs speed, so the criteria will focus on permitting that to happen as fast as possible.
There are different codes because there are different key parameters. In ASME B31.3, the entire facility is in the same proximity to population density, sensitive environments, etc. A pipeline can run from zero population density and non-sensitive environments through metropolitan areas and critically sensitive environments. Each area calls for its own risk assessment. B31.4 and B31.8 handle this by defining location classes. That is not a term used in B31.3.
The news story was such crap. Headlines with "Disaster" and inflammatory language about 21,000 gallons of leaked oil. In Santa Barbara. Just a few miles from the Santa Barbara Channel oil seep that puts nearly that much oil into the ocean every day for the last several million years. This is a "Disaster", a "Crises", a "Crime" because it came out of a pipeline I suppose?
Don't get me wrong, a pipeline operating adjacent to recreation areas that doesn't have proper isolation valves and leak sensors is most likely a crime. People breaking the law should be held accountable. But damn, can't we dial back the rhetoric? If you say "nearly 4 miles of beach" in the "right" tone of voice it really sounds like a big deal. It is not a big deal. When I was a kid, the 30 miles of beach just south of Huntington Beach was called "Tin Can Beach" (now Bolsa Chica State Park) by everyone because it looked so nasty and in addition to the trash the gave it its name, the oil seeps from off shore coated everything with oil and tar. We went there because the crowds at Huntington and Seal beaches were unpleasant even back then and my dad wouldn't tolerate them. Every time you left tin can beach you had to scrape tar off of everything. In the late 1960's the state cleaned up the trash, but the oil was still there as late as 2001 (last time I was there). That beach (like the Santa Barbara Channel) had many millions of gallons of oil on it and since there was no company to vilify, it was considered "natural". It was in fact a part of nature. This spill was caused by the actions (or inactions) of people. Those actions and inactions should carry consequences, but "Disaster"? I don't think so.
zdas, Ask those oil coated birds. Disaster is subjective. It seems that far more people view this as a disaster, so for all intents and purpose that what it is. Besides, why exactly does it matter what you chose to call it. Doesn't change anything. No fewer birds were harmed. Are you really griping about "bad press". That's the least harmful thing of all, and if the press is right, they deserve all of that... and more. Bad press should be the least of our worries. We should worry more about doing things that would prevent it from ever happening in the first place.
I am worried about proportion. If every single thing in the world is "AWESOME" what will people say if they witness the second coming? If a 21,000 gallon spill is a "DISASTER" what do you call the earthquake in Nepal?
In the live feed you linked the worst they could come up with was a rock partially covered by oil and two guys SEARCHING for ANY birds that they could film and maybe help, no luck. The only animals they showed were a non-oily duck and a dog in in its owners arms. This happened on Tuesday and by Saturday they still don't have any oily-duck pictures.
As of 8 hours ago CNN Claims there were "5 pelicans and a sea lion" affected. A tiny bit short of a Disaster 5 days after the rupture.
Its not just the crude - there may be other worse nasties that cause more biological harm at far lower concentrations - corrosion inhibitors, demulsifiers, defoamers, viscosity modifiers.... some of these rear their heads after a long time. And now we will have the emergency response teams with these "surfactants" too.
Maybe there will be some data. The pipeline was "tested" about two weeks ago. Probably means an intelligent pig run.
Pipeline was experiencing "mechanical difficulties on both sides of the line".
Local DA promises to hold the responsible parties accountable.
It would be interesting if the smart pig found a major discontinuity in the failure location, but the final analyses of the data had not been completed. If so, very poor karma!
Man I would love to see a technical paper comparing the smart-pig results in the area of the failure to the cut-out analysis. As far as I've been able to find every smart-pig paper compares pig output to a predicted failure rate. This line would allow someone to compare an actual failure to the data collection. There is no way for the industry to lose on that one. If the pig would have said "DANGER, DANGER, DANGER Will Robinson" at that point then the credibility of smart pigging (or at least that particular tool) would go through the roof. If the pig would have said "looks good for another 25 years" then it allows an opportunity to introduce some new calibration and/or assessment tools.
My guess is that the legal processes will keep the data out of the light of day for a decade if not forever. Another unfortunate result of the media and regulators rush to blame.
FYI ...Actually this section of the pipeline was not completed when I left All American Pipeline back in 8-89, it was still under construction. This pipeline was originally funded by Good Year, engineered by Marmac Engineering Services. At the time there was a real problem getting enough oil to put through the line. It was sold to Equilon Enterprises LLC I believe (not sure when) and later to Plains in 3-02. I'm semi curious as to what actually happen!??
Well someone didn't put in a shutoff valve that would work either manually in time to stop the leak, or automatically, or the operator was doing something else at the time.
This is exactly what happens when operators will not do anything except what they are forced to do by regulation. The problem is not with the lack of regulations, it is with irresponsible operators. PHMSA has long been calling for operators to install and use automatic valves for these situations, but with the absence of regulations, PHMSA has no teeth. All they can do is ask.
In this case it appears that having this California regulation would not have helped, since the leak was actually in California, but the pressure source and most of the pipeline are in offshore federal waters. Exactly why the CA Fire Marshall's office returned responsibility for oversight back to PHMSA, because CAFM had no authority in Fed waters and they knew they could not provide effective oversight. Once PHMSA had full responsibility, they didn't have the regulation to force the installation of an automatic valve. The operator could have bridged the fed/state gap, but that unfortunately would have required some proactivity and far too much assumption of civic responsibility by the operator, which is about as rare as hobby horse crap and apparently getting rarer by the moment.
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