The finger can point a bunch of ways on the Gulf Oil Spill 3

[zdas04]

I just read this article from the Heritage Foundation (a conservative think tank, anyone who automatically discounts anything conservative should probably stop reading now) talking about the spill in broad terms. Apparently there were at least 13 nations that offered help and expertise within hours of the fire that started this mess. Our government either refused help or refused to respond to them.

The article goes on to say that nearly 7,600 people in Louisiana are out of work due to the drilling ban. It is costing the state nearly $3 billion not counting tourism or the cleanup. The people referenced in Salazar's decision to stop drilling have written letters objecting to their names being used when they supported a ban in 1,000 ft of water not 500 ft--the difference is huge since most wells in the gulf are in less than 1,000 ft of water or more than 2,000 ft. There are a bunch of wells and drilling sites between 500 and 1,000 ft.

BP is going to pay and pay big. They may not end up being viable after this without merging with someone, but when the blame is being allocated, the U.S. government needs to get a significant portion of it.

David

 

[whammett]

7,600 people in Louisiana are out of work due to the drilling ban

That's as of now. I am currently in Louisiana. It's terrible. As drilling companies and contractors reserve funds dry up more and more people will be layed off.

"Scientists dream about doing great things. Engineers do them." -James Michener

 

[DrillerNic]

I've got a pal in Aberdeen who sells subsea equipment for FMC... he says that he's been told to contact all his customers like BG Norge, asking if they want their subsea trees etc a few months early as FMC in the states have had so many oil companies tell them the subsea tree ready for delivery at the start of July or whatever won't be needed for a year or so...

I've heard 15 rigs are stacked now around the Gulf Coast due to the moratorium on deep water drilling. Those rigs will soon be going elsewhere on long term contracts, and won't be back for years. Petrobras in Brazil must be over the moon- they have a lot of deepwater drilling to do (think of the Tupi field). Good fo the people of Sao Paulo, pretty bad for the people of the Gulf Coast.

Still, politicians like populist, knee jerk reactions like "no more deepwater drilling!" don't they?

 

[brimmer]

It was Obama that imposed the drilling moratorium, not bp. Why didn't they think this through a little more? Impose a moratorium on bp, and review other companies practices. Nothing like shooting yourself in the foot and blaming someone else, then trying to get someone else to pay for your stupidity.

 

[rmw]

Hey, those idiots were duly elected by a free nation in free elections. We got what we deserved.

rmw

 

[waross]

Anyone remember when we all thought that the one with the most votes won the election?

Bill
--------------------
"Why not the best?"
Jimmy Carter

 

[BigInch]

Its not a matter of practices. Theoretically, if BP's own proceedures were followed, this wouldn't have happened. Its a matter of the ability first to follow proceedures, secondly to correctly predict and third to control an accident against the risk of massive damage. Think of it as why attached wooden buildings, stockpiling explosives, and nuclear bombs stored downtown. Fact is that NOBODY has demonstrated that they can control a blowout at 5000 ft depth. I don't know if anyone has even controlled one at 500 ft either, but if they have ever been able to do so, they should probably still have to prove they can do it again and again and again. Commercial pilots take a check ride once a year. What's different, except although he might kill more people in one shot, a commercial pilot isn't going to do near the environmental and long term economic damage as this baby. The facts are (apparently) somebody allowed a giant step to be taken where a tiny little step might have been more appropriate and now safety and control technology will have to catch up before drilling will be allowed again. This is the 3 Mile Island-BearSterns-Madorf-Oring event of the oil industry, if not its Chernobyl. There will be a big step backward before any forward steps are considered. This is the engineering equivalent of "Too big to fail".

"We have a leadership style that is too directive and doesn't listen sufficiently well. The top of the organisation doesn't listen sufficiently to what the bottom is saying." Tony Hayward CEO BP
"Being GREEN isn't easy." Kermit

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpiIWMWWVco

http://virtualpipeline.spaces.liv

 

[BigInch]

Norway has suspended drilling.

http://www.offshore247.com/news/art.aspx?Id=16854

A reported 30 rigs are stacked in the Gulf of Mexico. Even at $500K/day each, that's peanuts. Of much more consequence is the delay of projects and the construction of facilities that will be needed to produce the supposed new wells subject to the moratorium.

None of the existing 4700+ already producing wells in the GOM is affected. Can't say the same for the fish.

"We have a leadership style that is too directive and doesn't listen sufficiently well. The top of the organisation doesn't listen sufficiently to what the bottom is saying." Tony Hayward CEO BP
"Being GREEN isn't easy." Kermit

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpiIWMWWVco

http://virtualpipeline.spaces.liv

 

[DrillerNic]

Big Inch- not quite- The Nogs have just said they won't license any more deep water blocks.... drilling on the Norwegian sector is continuing. Any deep water wells currently approved are drilling (although I wouldn't like to be applying for a new deepwater well now!).

As you know, because of the difficulties on well control in deep water, for the last couple of decades, the emphasis has been on well control prevention in deepwater rather than cure- so emergency BOP control systems (EDS, deadman switches, AMF systems, auto disconnects, auto shears, accoustic systems), mandatory well control training (IWCF or WellCAP) for everone, special attention paid to well design, in particular the small window between pore and fracture gradients and so.

But on this well, the blowout occured while the well was being suspended (which might be part of the problem- the well was 'over' so people relaxed slightly?) and the BOP failed..... we still don't know why the BOP didn't close fully when the initial kick was seen, and we don't know why the rig's deadman switch seems to have failed.

I think we'll see teh following changes:

1. all rigs to have a genuine fully independent BOP emergency actuation system, and this system to be fail safe... so instead of a deadman system saying "close" when needed (or not in this case!) it will say "open" continuously, and if the signal is lost, the BOP will close and the LMRP disconnect.

2. This emergency system to be fully tested as part of the BOP function & pressure tests. The charts might have to be forwarded to the regualtor too, who might be involved in granting any dispensations beyond two week test intervals.

3. subsea BOP shear rams to cut tool joints on 5" pipe (and up to say, 6" drill collar?)

4. Well control equipment to contain a blowout avaialble within 1 day's sail (ie the top hat, a properly engineered dome, riser, booms, skimmer boats), so that the gear can be deployed immediately rather than waiting a week for it to be fabricated and then forgetting about a chemcial injection line as you are such a rush Basically, Wild Well Control have one set of gear in Stavager, one set in Aberdeen, one set in the Gulf Coast, one set in Cabinda, that sort of thing.

5. For the US only- removing the conflict of interest between the MMS' roles as safety regualtor and encouraging production. The UK realised this problem with their regualtion contributed to the Piper Alpha disaster, and split the safety role of the DTi to the HSE; something the US government failed to learn from in 1989. Obama has now said he will separate the two sides of the MMS..... The US has to face up to the fact that the US offshore environment has a higher fatality rate, injury rate and well control incident rate than other offshore environments such as Canada, the UK, Brazil and Norway, and should start to ask itself why, and then do something about it- changing the work culture, adopting safety cases and goal setting regulations, whatever, I don't know, as I've never worked in the GoM

 

[waross]

Good points, Nic.
Can we add, BOPs to be constructed to facilitate operation and service, such as the ability to connect directly to the BOP hydraulics for the individual rams by an ROV?

Bill
--------------------
"Why not the best?"
Jimmy Carter

 

[BigInch]

Oh I think that will be the least you'll see. I'd almost bet the ranch that there will be a proven blowN-out control technology before anyone gets anywhere near 5000 ft again. 30 rigs in a stack is the least of the problem now. 7500 offshore people out of work is nothing to the number that will be out of work by August with nobody going to the beach, restaruants, or taking those fishing trips. The new regulations are going to come from the grass roots, not the presidential palace, the board rooms, or the mud line. Even my 76 year old aunt is "Angry" and that effect is going to get much, much worse by August.

"We have a leadership style that is too directive and doesn't listen sufficiently well. The top of the organisation doesn't listen sufficiently to what the bottom is saying." Tony Hayward CEO BP
"Being GREEN isn't easy." Kermit

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpiIWMWWVco

http://virtualpipeline.spaces.liv

 

[brimmer]

Hmmmm, I think I watched an interview staring Tony when this whole thing started stating it a was transocean rig, transocean equipment, transocean personnel, transocean procedures, etc... So does the government investigate drilling company procedures? Who's procedures are used?

One thing I don't understand, did the seal assembly or float collar sitting at the top of the well fail?

Apparently anecdotal evidence suggests the captain hit the EDS 7 minutes after the initial explosion.

 

[DrillerNic]

Brimmer- Generallt, anything to do with the rig and rig equipment is usually done to the drilling contractor's procedures. Routine operations like tripping, are done with drilling contractor procedures. Anything to do with the well is done according to the oil company's procedures.

So for eaxmple, the oil company will say BOPs, choke manifold and standpipe manifold will be function and pressure tested to such and such pressure every two weeks. There might be a particular oil company hang up too- in my experience Shell don't like cup testers- but the actual procedure for testing the BOP and so on (including, say, checking the charge in the deadman batteries) would be the drilling contractor's procedure, as it is their equipment. Acceptance criteria, would be agreed together.

In the UK, all installations, including rigs, have a Safety Case, where the rig operator ahs to show the equipment and procedures have reduced all risks to a low as resonably practicable. This includes stuff like evacuation, well control and so on, and the regualtors can simply say "well, what if...." and you have to show that it can't happen because of this and this and this or that if it does happen then this and this will reduce the effects. Any change to the rig's equpiment requested by the oil company also results in the safety case changing. This is how it works in the UK; I have no idea what is done in the GoM.

No-one knows really if the casing shoe or the casing hanger seal failed. According to the DDRs, the production casing had passed two normal pressure tests- one after bumping the plugs and one after WOC. Of course, these don't really check if the floats are holding (which is why BP wanted to do an inflow test). However, the DDRs again show no indication of leaking floats during the cement job and there's nothing to suggest a wet shoe (no overdisplacement for example), so my guess is that the casing hanger seal is the most likely. This is supported by BP's concern during the top kill of excessive pressure fracturing the casing, which suggests to me the concern was intermediate strings rather than the production string, which would (or at least should!) be designed to deal with a well kill scenario.

 

[brimmer]

Thanks DrillerNic.
A link to an interesting read.

http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100614/Hayward.BP.2010.6.14.pdf

 

[DrillerNic]

Brimmer- I've not seen the letter you linked too, and it is very interesting reading. And I'm afraid it doesn't look that different to things that I've experienced and the choices that are made designing and drilling wells.


1. Casing design- it's clear that BP were having difficulties trying to decide between a liner/ tie back or a single string of casing. I've done both on high pressure wells in the past, and there are risks for both. BP changed their mind at least twice (the inquiry letter refers to a plan from Mid April that said "long string of casing ...was the primary option... the liner... is now recommended" but then in the application the design has changed back to a long string of casing). The tie back would give a third barrier (despite what Mr Roth says, I don't know many people who cement a tie back string- but then he's from Halliburton, so pumping cement is what he knows), but would introduce risks of the tie back seal failing, polished bore recepticle fouling and so on. And while the tie back option would cost more, good industry practise says two barriers are sufficient.....so the long casing string does seem technically OK (and let's not forget, that's what we engineers do- we come up with the cheapest technically acceptable solution, isn't it?).

2.Centralisers just indicates a logistics cock up... not enough centralisrs on the rig. Hindsight is always 20:20, but think the combination of "a vertical well, we'll centralise the shoe track, we can get moderate centralisation with what we've got, so we'll be fine" led the wellsite team to run the casing anyway (the attitude of the Ops DE "it's done... I'd rather have a squeeze than get stuck" is instructive- I've had a company man decide not run centralisers as "they're shit and they get stuck"... he's 200km away from the office and ultimately does what he wants as the wellsite is his fiefdom!)

3. CBL- I've never run a CBL on new casing in the 12 years I've been drilling wells. They are ambiguous and difficult to interpret. They also lead to the question "so what do you do about a poor cement job?" Squeeze cement jobs often create more problems than they solve and introcude all sorts of other risks. The MMS regulations quoted in the inquiry letter say that a CBL should be run on indications of a poor cement job. The letter from the inquiry says that as the well had a POTENTIALLY inadequate cement job (my emphasis) the CBL should have been done regardless. BP mobilised the wireline crew in case they needed a CBL, but on the daily report I've seen from the senate inquiries, the cement job went off without a hitch (ie no indications of a poor cement job when they did it), so Schlumberger were de mobilised. Mr Roth covering his arse as a cementer "If the cement is to be relied upon as an effective barrier, the well owner must perform a cement evaluation as part of a comprehensive systems integrity test" is pretty shameful slopy shouldering- the cement contractor ought to be able to provide some idea if the cement job is a good one surely? Would you accept a plumber telling you that it's up to you to check the reliability of his repair to your house?

4. Mud conditioning- this is poor, and appears to be the wellsite team doing what they feel like rather than what's in the plan from the beach. Which unfortunately happens (see above).

5. The casing hanger lock down sleeve does look poor too, to me. I've always run them at the same time as running & testing the casing hanger seal (mainly so that I can get the wellhead guy off the rig ASAP to save money).



So, without seeing the full context of these things (so for example, what percentage of similar wells in the GoM have tie back / liner production strings? How many times this year have CBLs run in the GoM? How many times on deepwater wells? and so on) it looks like poor wellsite supervison (insufficient mud circualtion, possibly only running the 6 centralisers); poor well managment (only having 6 centralisers offshore); poor well design in terms of the casing hanger lock down sleeve; a clearly difficult (and marginal?) choice in the production string design, that with hindsight, picked the wrong option; and again hindsight showing that BP made the wrong call with the CBL, (although it's not definite whether a CBL would have shown anything). At the time I think it was a reasonable call to make- it's a call I've made the same way.

So partly poor supervison, partly poor well design, each OK individually but combining with other events to produce the 'perfect storm'. For me, key questions for the inquiry to ask would be: how many other high risk (ie deepwater or high pressure) wells in the GoM have single production casing strings? How many other such wells have CBLs run on them? How many other such wells are cemented un centralised? This information is all available in End of Well Reports, and I'm sure the MMS gets a copy of all of them.... is this well unique in its well construction or were BP just unlucky that it happened to them? That would be more useful to ensuring this never happens again in the GoM than just throwing the book at BP.

 

[BigInch]

Speaking from my experience in "both worlds", Americans typically don't have the "let's forget, regroup and charge forward" attitude I've seen elsewhere. An important point in State's culture is pinning down the responsible party and dispensing a quick and relatively severe justice, both of which I see are often of more immediate need than bugling the next charge. They're not nearly as inclined to allow somebody to get away as clean as what I've observed elsewhere. Oh... They'll get around to it, but not until the firing squad finishes their business. No criticism intended, as all cultures have their particular means of perpetuating themselves, just MO, as viewed from a geostationary orbit.

"We have a leadership style that is too directive and doesn't listen sufficiently well. The top of the organisation doesn't listen sufficiently to what the bottom is saying." Tony Hayward CEO BP
"Being GREEN isn't easy." Kermit

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpiIWMWWVco

http://virtualpipeline.spaces.liv