Mintjulip… I have hesitated replying simply due to the way this thread is turning… but I think it is necessary to express a few more thoughts.
YES melodramatic is an excellent expression of Your way-over-reaction.
I’ve moved forward in my career by sticking my “neck-out” and making engineering decisions that have been implemented on real aircraft flown by real live humans. NOTE: I NEVER stick-out my neck-out blindly or stupidly… and lunge forward… I always open my eyes and engaged my engineering brain, FIRST... then proceed forward at a rational pace.
Engineers MUST make critical decisions using the best analytical tools and processes available at the time. The next step is to take ACTION to implement those decisions in a timely manner so that REAL hardware can fly. I have seen analytically skilled engineers, "freeze-up" due to fear and confusion, resulting in NO actions taken. Often, these folks are infused with negative "I can't do that" or "I don't have enough knowledge to do that" or "If something goes wrong... they will blame me" stuck in their brains. Skilled engineers MUST be capable of doing the possible with relative ease... and stretching-hard to work major real-world challenges to develop flight hardware. If we are NOT capable of doing the relatively simple work proposed by cmarinelli, we might as well call this a hobby… not a profession.
Bogus parts are a problem... but there are regulations and proceedures for keeping them OFF aircraft. Likewise there are proceedures to develop and utilize airworthy [approved] parts, from alternate sources by using good reverse engineering practices and and proven fabrication practices.
For every Case You cited above, OEM engineering and FAA approval had been granted.
In the cases of MAINTENANCE ERRORS cited, engineering involvement was hardly a factor: IE work was done improperly. NOTE: By definition, maintainers can ONLY work to approved technical data. NOTE: FAA approved engineers [DFR, Liaison, etc] have authority to generate (create) tech-data where no data currently exists… and/or alter approved design data… such as for alternate parts, materials, processes, repairs, maintenance procedures, etc… when rational/logical/justifiable, to keep aircraft flying.
In the cargo door failure cited: NO Alterations, NO deviations and NO "unapproved parts or repairs" were noted… just faulty design and poor operation/maintenance. Note: we learn from these hard lessons and march on…. or pack-up and give-in.
NOTE: The Concorde was an accident waiting to happen. The entire Concord accident report is available at the following website... so You can judge for Yourself:
This was a thorough report and: every aspect was considered and numerous "tough/hard" findings/conclusions were presented. Systemic complacency, in my opinion, was the PRIMARY cause for that accident. In that case there was a demonstrated weakness in the Concorde design for catastrophic tire failures and subsequent damage mitigation… as indicated by numerous prior incidents. OH Yeah… and there was a mandatory protocol for runway FOD inspection [by ground vehicle] just prior to Concorde take-off/landings, which was neglected by airport authorities [implemented due to known tire-failure issues]. European lawyers would love to presume the simple answer that You proposed, in order to deflect/reduce the blame [and liability] away from the Concorde designers, Air France, and Charles de Galle airport authorities... onto a “fat” American airline company [Continental].
Regards, Wil Taylor