Alaska Airlines flight forced to make an emergency landing... 82

[CWB1]

doesn't mean they necessarily have a passion for a machine over money

Its often more than that. A few years ago I jumped from engineering to govt regulation for more money and a guaranteed 37.5 hour workweek. I miss the challenge of engineering but have a much broader, still very interesting view of industry now and am working with a higher level of industry/corporate management. More importantly, there's no stress to constantly have new innovations completed yesterday and more time for non-work activities. I always managed to balance burning the candle at both ends without sacrificing my family, health, or hobbies, but being in the auto industry definitely soured me a bit on automotive hobbies and made scheduling my vacations/personal life difficult.

 

[Brian Malone]

CWB1 - good points - as you point out generalizations can miss the details of each person's situation and motivation.

More importantly, there's no stress to constantly have new innovations completed yesterday

This aspect of engineering never changes!

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

https://www.businessinsider.com/ala...door-blowout-company-response-earnings-2024-1

Seems they have two work card systems which don't talk to each other.

I suspect that will be quite near the top of a list to resolve.

 

[thebard3]

I think all this talk about financial lures, bean counters, and engineers with MBAs misses the point. A good example is to consider the failures that led NASA to lose 2 space shuttles and 14 astronauts. Poor management decisions that led to both accidents were certainly NOT driven by bottom line financial considerations. Egotism, hubris and bombastic personalities generally serve themselves, whether for financial or any other reason. I'm not saying finances don't matter, but I wouldn't be inclined to put blame there first.

Brad Waybright

The more you know, the more you know you don't know.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

You have a star, you completely correct

 

[3DDave]

Negative personality traits and profit motives may have nothing at all to do with it.

Normalization of adverse events is enough.

If something didn't fail yesterday or the day before or the day before that, then it is easy to believe it will not fail today.

The problem is not knowing just how close to failure something is if it doesn't fail, particularly if the mode of failure or contributors to failure aren't imagined.

Sure, engineers know that a door departing mid-flight is a really bad outcome, but the assemblers don't. For them it becomes just another day where things aren't assembled correctly. Every day upper management is believing that the line workers are doing what the instructions say, and they very likely are, but they aren't asking what the line does when the instructions are created on the fly.

Like the o-rings on the shuttle boosters. NASA management likely knew that the o-rings were getting chewed up on most every flight. But they held and nothing bad happened.

The line workers get chewed up every day. And they held. Until they didn't.

 

[1503-44]

I doubt the missing bolts or incorrect installation traces directly back to the CEO; this could be entirely an assembly procedure screw up. It is not the same type of problem experienced before, in that no design choice was purposely chosen to save money, even though the design was unstable in climb and subsequently "fixed" with software. That's on the CEO's desk. This one not so much. It is apparently the result of an erroneous, or incomplete procedure. Of course, the buck stops at the top, but the physical trace back to CEO level is a bit tortuous.

--Einstein gave the same test to students every year. When asked why he would do something like that, "Because the answers had changed."

 

[thebard3]

Bad management has momentum. The start of Boeing's troubles date back a couple of decades and no matter what they say and how they approach it, they won't be turning it around soon.

Brad Waybright

The more you know, the more you know you don't know.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

As an aside what state will the rest of the hull be in after an explosive decompression?

I presume a 3 month old aircraft isn't written off. But it must be a hefty about of man hours to get it flying again.

I presume Boeing will foot the bill though...

 

[dik]

Good point, Alistair... I had no idea that the sudden decompression could affect the rest of the plane... but, it would be a 'sudden jolt'.

-----*****-----
So strange to see the singularity approaching while the entire planet is rapidly turning into a hellscape. -John Coates

-Dik

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

I have zero clue either.

It wasn't that high so cabin differential also not that big but I would have thought explosive decompression is more of an ultimate load case not operating.

I presume the mounting frame will have to come out and various things replaced round that.

Rear pressure bulkhead damage/fatigue life reduced?

 

[waross]

Was it hubris that led to cuts on labour and the retaliation against inspectors who did their job honestly?

--------------------
Ohm's law
Not just a good idea;
It's the LAW!

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

I think that was about the finding that one of the "new" plants which was meant to be producing precision parts they went and inspected and found the workers were producing them with none certified hand tools instead of laser profile cutters.

They then refused the parts in the assembly shop.

And the solution was sack the inspectors that were refusing the parts.

 

[hokie66]

The NTSB has determined that four key bolts were missing.

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/06/business/ntsb-boeing-alaska-door-plug-blowout-faa/index.html

 

[3DDave]

That finding is a complete surprise. To no one. I have the preliminary report being downloaded and I hope it answers the better question. What kept the door in place for so many flights. It should have remained in place for zero flights and should not have been in place leaving the workstation it was (re)installed at.

 

[Murph 9000]

The preliminary report is available direct from the NTSB on the investigation page:

NTSB: In-flight structural failure, Alaska Airlines flight 1282

Direct link: DCA24MA063 Preliminary report.pdf

(At the time of posting, it looks like the NTSB web server bandwidth is saturated, so downloads may be extremely slow.)

 

[hokie66]

You can read it on the CNN web page I linked to.

 

[LittleInch]

The size of the bolts still looks very small and it is easy to see why they were not missed. Looks like they were there before they removed the door though.

No mention here of the way in which the two document systems were reported as working against each other but guess that comes later.

No real mention of why they thought the door went on this flight and not on the previous 100+ flights.

Looks like the cockpit door is intended to fly open on a depressurisation...

Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.

 

[dik]

I hate it when I rebuild an engine and have a handful of bolts left over...

-----*****-----
So strange to see the singularity approaching while the entire planet is rapidly turning into a hellscape. -John Coates

-Dik

 

[IRstuff]

I hate it when I rebuild an engine and have a handful of bolts left over...

But, it wasn't even as complicated as an engine; there were only 8(?) bolts to start with, and they left off at least 3. What's truly annoying is that the hatch was only removed to get access to the damaged rivets, which were in the bulkhead adjacent to the hatch.

TTFN (ta ta for now)
I can do absolutely anything. I'm an expert!

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