I know some members, including me, were shocked by what happened in the infamous 737 Max MCAS system, but are you guys just enjoying a big pile-on now? The ongoing threads just for bashing the big B are getting old. They F'd up, heads rolled, penalties were paid (not steep enough IMO) and there are other lawsuits ongoing.
I just spent a week in a room full of Boeing engineers and I have to say that the integrity in that room was unquestionable, and the reason we were all together was to become better engineers (specialized training). I got the sense that the pendulum has swung the other way now. A couple of months ago I boarded 737 Max jets (twice) and I was completely comfortable doing it.
The subject of this thread; a non-standard installation process is a problem, and a one that needs to be fixed, but worthy of endless speculation about what it could be? As SWComposites points out, it could be one of many deficiencies in the installation, so do any of you think you can get to the bottom of it? We are so far removed I don't think it's possible. You want me to guess; here goes: what if it's an expired can of sealant? Have fun with that. The article cited at the top by the OP is just the same kind of speculation, and probably has more words in it than the actual nonconformity report.
The fact that the problem was reported, provoking an immediate action to correct it, says that a system of inspection is working. It is very hard to detect non-compliant processes. You don't always have a dimension you can put your caliper across to measure - it's hiding in something's datalog like temperature or humidity. The finding also give me a strong indication that there were 2 layers of inspection at play (one on the plane and one of the paperwork afterward). That's a good thing, and the inspection system just showed off how robust it is.
I challenge any of you armchair experts to show off a time when you did any better.
Hi Spar.
My thoughts as I read your post were echoed by Alistair's first two sentences.
I would go one step further and point at the pressures on management by the board of directors.
It is my understanding that the "McDonnell Douglas mind set MBAs" were in place because that is the management style that the board of directors wanted in place.
I understand that the board has "owned" this and now have a board member tasked with overseeing safety issues.
Your very positive comments on the integrity of the Boeing engineers is good news.
-------------------- Ohm's law
Not just a good idea; It's the LAW!
In the old days the technical board members were personally known in the design offices and could hold their own at shake down meetings on technical content.
And they had lunches with the test pilots with no witnesses.
Please keep in mind that the 737 Max is a product of Boeing management, NOT McDonnell Douglas. Most of those so-called 'McDonnell Douglas MBA's', if they're still around after the 1997 'merger', are more than likely involved in the military and aerospace side of the business. The commercial side of MDC was pretty much shut down after the merger, but their influence on the non-commercial business was much more significant and long-lasting.
Disclaimer, I worked for McDonnell Douglas for 11 years, albeit in their Automation division, but the other business units were clients of ours and so I spent a lot of time in their Long Beach, Huntington Beach and Saint Louis manufacturing facilities. However, they sold our division to EDS in 1991, but they stayed our customer, and of course that continued after the Boeing deal, only it was pretty much on the military/aerospace side with only a little bit of new penetration into the old Boeing part of the company (except in a few of their military/aerospace units, we had never sold all that much software into Boeing, mostly because, even after the EDS buyout, they still considered us as being associated with MDC).
What did the Boeing board of directors look like compared to MDC.
Were there individuals on both boards?
How much of the MDC board became part of the Boeing board?
There may have been a trend of cross directorships leading up to the merger.
-------------------- Ohm's law
Not just a good idea; It's the LAW!
Knowing how the MDC people talked about Boeing, and how the Boeing people talked about MDC people, when we had to deal with Boeing when trying to sell them software, if those attitudes permeated up to the board level, I'd be shocked if there was any common board members. As for how many MDC people ended-up anywhere accept those military and aerospace divisions, I don't think it was all that many that ended-up in the commercial aircraft side of the business, at least not after they had shutdown the Long Beach non-military operation (note that they assembled C-17's in Long Beach, which originally did evolve out of their commercial operation). Besides, despite what the headlines might say, it was a merger in name only. In reality, it was a takeover. After all, when the dust settled, the name on all of the buildings was spelled 'B O E I N G'.
That being said, there was ONE thing that Boeing did retain from MDC, and it was something which, while it was rather minor in scope and importance, it was a very raw issue when it came to the Boeing people.
Over the years Boeing really never had a real 'logo' other than the name of the company. Granted, that had evolved over the years, but there was never anything graphical or symbolic which stuck in people's minds. McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand, always put a lot of effort and emphasis on it's logo. And so what happened was that after the 'merger', within a year or so, Boeing decided to publish and start using an actual logo, and guess what, it looked almost identical to the old MDC logo, which had been seen and recognized throughout the aerospace industry (including the commercial aircraft sector) for decades. As you can imagine, the old hard-line Boeing people were not happy with this.
The show you what I mean, here are some images that will demonstrate this.
This was the Boeing logo before the 'merger':
This was the McDonnell Douglas logo prior to the 'merger':
And this is what became the Boeing logo after the 'merger':
But the insult didn't end there. You see the symbolic portion of the McDonnell Douglas logo that they had been using for years, it was actually a modification of the old Douglas Aircraft logo.
This was the McDonnell Aircraft Company logo before the 1963 merger with Douglas Aircraft (which, when you look at the final company, was closer to a true merger):
And this was the logo used by the Douglas Aircraft Company at the time:
So you can clearly see where the new McDonnell Douglas combined company got their inspiration when it came time to create a symbolic image for the company.
Now lets get back to that new Boeing logo. In reality, the symbolism which Boeing added to the logo of the new company was actually something that can be traced back to the old Douglas Aircraft Company, the company that the people at the commercial aircraft division of Boeing, which was the biggest part of the old Boeing, really considered to be their lifelong competitor, if not their arch enemy, and now every time they looked at the new Boeing logo they're being reminded of not only McDonnell Douglas, but of DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT.
McD bought Boeing with Boeing’s $, then proceeded to take over (yes, including Commercial Airplanes) and proceeded to ruin the company (in spite of the many great and talented engineers still there).
I found this article several years ago, which I think is a pretty good discussion about the MDC/Boeing merger. Link
You could use it as a case study to describe how hubris, bombast, and the desire to maximize profits is usually at the center of these types of events.
Brad Waybright
The more you know, the more you know you don't know.
Part of the Boeing debacle includes the effort to reduce engineering salary overhead costs by moving seattle area jobs to their new offices in other states . This movement of jobs resulted in hiring younger, less experienced engineers and managers at reduced cost and retiring many higher paid senior engineers. The process of approving a critical control system using only one vulnerable input sensor is still very difficult to rationalize and it seems such a clear defect in logic that I still cannot wrap my head around how they could allow it to happen.
In order to reduce payouts for damages to families of the victims, they prohibited victim families from speaking at the civil trial, which appears to be contrary to law and is now being appealed.There has been enough time to have also changed out appeals court judges to those that are sympathetic to Boeing, but some other authority would need to investigate that possibility. Some things never change; although we may wish that judges are impartial and not personally compromised, the founding fathers of the US gov't were familiar with how corrupt judges could actually be , and so the most important judgements in political cases are sometimes referrred to the representative assembly.
"...when logic, and proportion, have fallen, sloppy dead..." Grace Slick
Pete Buttigeg appoint somebody? It's probably best if he takes another leave of absence and lets the position go unfilled. The entire administration has put an end to merit based hiring.
Typical assembly methods would not allow that to happen - potentially how this happened is part of the "pay-me" section. $69 for the full report or $300 per year ($99/quarter)
It would be useful to know the sequence that produced this result.
