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BP Explosion 6

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Was this a butane or pentane/hexane isomerization unit?

Vita sine litteris mors est.
 
Rich2001,

I haven’t heard anything about the specific type process unit involved. But talking to a buddy that has worked at the plant he said that he has heard from several sources that stared with problems with a flare stack. This is also mentioned in the side bar of the following. All dead are contractors.

 
This morning I heard that it was a raffinate leak that set off the explosion. The unit was in start up. The contractor trailers were still on the unit site and were destroyed.
 
Weren't the contractor trailers (where most were injured or killed) used for construction on a different unit? Weren't the trailers coincidentally in the path of the blast? Some facts should be coming out soon. Consider waiting for the formal report instead of believing that the newspaper or TV reporters understand the details.

John
 
It's astonishing how many errors TV reporters manage to put in a 1 minute news item when it comes to refining/chemical. You discover that only when you see your own plant on tv (I once saw a major distillation tower being erected and laughed my @$$ off when I heard the comments).
 
Witness Evidence Points to Atmospheric Vent Stack in BP Texas City Refinery Explosion

Witnesses describe the release of hydrocarbon liquid and vapor from an approximately 100-foot tall atmospheric vent stack located in the northwest corner of the isomerization unit. They observed this liquid and vapor falling toward the ground seconds before a powerful explosion. At the time of the explosion, the raffinate splitter subunit was being restarted after a maintenance turnaround on the isomerization unit. Based on our review of plant schematic diagrams, the atmospheric vent stack was connected to pressure relief devices for the raffinate splitter distillation column. Witness evidence points to possible ignition sources on the ground near the vent stack.
Click to expand...
from

Vita sine litteris mors est.
 
According Huston Chronicle
“BP spokesman Bill Stephens Friday said the fire, which erupted at 2:45 p.m. Tuesday from a three-fourth inch bleeder valve on a furnace line in the plant's isomerization unit, was quickly put out with a hand-held fire extinguisher.
``We will look at it with all the other information and see if there is any connection,'' Stephens said. ``Fires are not supposed to happen.''
The seconds-long blaze was attributed to a missing valve plug.
The explosion at the 1,200-acre plant bordering Texas 146 occurred as workers attempted to restart the refinery's isomerization unit after a two-week shutdown for maintenance. "This is one of the most vulnerable times," said John Miles, regional director for the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration.”
 
"Fires are not supposed to happen..." - that's a beautiful blinding flash of the obvious, spokesman, I would rather tend to think that these are the kinds of fires you'd rather not want to put out before cutting out the furnace feed.
 
I don't know how many of those in the Petroleum Refining industry are following this closely, but this is going to be an industry-changing episode.

Laid on my desk this week was a safety bulletin outlining my company's plans to reduce the risk of temporary trailers/structures used in the plant confines.

I have heard (rumor mill only) that OSHA (?) will be developing a facility siting requirement - dealing with restrictions for trailers/structures within blast overpressure zones - as a result of the explosion at BP.

Anyone else have similar comments?

~NiM
 
Currently OSHA's Process Safety Information requirements include "Siting Factors". In our HAZOPs we interpret this to include a walk around the site to identify such hazards as barriers to fast egress and trailers that don't have to be so close to operating units.

HAZOP at
 
Yesterday Shell were fined £900,000 for the deaths of two guys on the Brent Bravo in Spetember 2003...I wonder what BP's fine will run to for this refinery incident?
 
BP has issued a preliminary report and press release regarding the ISOM unit explosion. You can get the report here:


Edward L. Klein
Pipe Stress Engineer
Houston, Texas

"All the world is a Spring"

All opinions expressed here are my own and not my company's.
 
Ouch. The F-20 revamp and connection to the flare project sounds like the medium priority high cost project that never gets approved but never gets cancelled either... until the thing blows itself up. I guess every refinery has their F-20 equivalent (at least we did). Why can't we learn without this kind of tragedies...
 
Refinery and chemical plants typically lack the equipment protection requirements that are applied to an offshore facility. In addition to the DCS level controls, every offshore vessel requires a seperate high level shutdown system and valve that would stop the liquid inflow. Perhaps the refining and petrochemical groups within API etc. should incorporate similar requirements as described in API RP 14C for the offshore industry.

BTW, maintenance bypasses might still permit such operator errors but not without multiple alarms. Normally the shutdown system alarms and indications are still active even if the shutdown is bypassed. No startup bypass would typically apply to high level. A startup bypass for the low level would likely become active once the level was established.

John
 
Just out of curiosity, the link in Rich2001's post suggests that both BP and the union are carrying out spearate accident investigations (whihc will possibly come to two different conclusions!); is there no US equivalent of the UK's HSE, a government agency with responsibilty for Health & Safety at work in the UK? The HSE would be leading this investigation in the UK (and have powers of arrest), possibly resulting in more public confidence in the findings of any investigation they carry out.
 
The Chemical Safety Board is investigating this incident, through tehe CSB does not have enforcement powers but generates regulations that are enforced by other goverment organizations such as OSHA .



Vita sine litteris mors est.
 

Veritatis una vis, una facies est.
Seneca
 
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