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Explosion at liquefied natural gas plant in Freeport Texas 7

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SPR drawdown saved the everyday Joe and transport industry plenty and may still be doing so. With inflation, if SPR is ever refilled, it will be with cheaper dollars. Until then, you are definitely ahead in that game. And don't forget Trump's plan was to sell it all and shut it down over a 10yr period anyway. In the meantime, don't worry about natural gas storage. That's all in private capital hands, so we are assured we will get the best deal possible, right?

And the caverns are not unlimited usage. You can drawdown about 10 times before the salt desolution affects the structural integrity. Shouldn't we try to get full use out of them while we can? It will be interesting to see if all the different blends can still be found on the market, Some are now depleting at their sources.



Einstein gave the same test to students every year. When asked why he would do something like that, "Because the answers had changed."
 
Total amature op.

"The report identified three root causes:

PHMSA report said:
Lack of both a pressure safety valve (PSV) testing procedure and a car seal program. A car seal program ensures that safety-critical valves are in the appropriate operating position i.e., open or closed.
Lack of safeguards to warn operators of increasing vacuum insulated pipe (VIP) temperature.
Lack of operational integrity of operating procedures.
Freeport listed contributing causes as:

Failure of a 2016 hazard and operability study to evaluate the potential for a blocked-in LNG piping segment with inadequate overpressure protection.
Failure to utilize management of change process for revisions to tank management operating procedures.
Failure to accurately and timely diagnose sudden pipe movement as being due to piping stresses from the overpressuring of an adjacent piping segment.
Operator fatigue as a result of significant overtime needs.
According to the report “more than one” control-board operator said that they were either not familiar with or had never seen the plant’s operating procedures. It also identified deficiencies in PSV testing procedures as contributing to human error that was part of the plant’s failure. Another cited human factor was alarm fatigue, noting that “there were alarms constantly indicating on equipment that had been placed out of service years ago.”

The report identified "severely damaged electrical conduit with open wiring” as the only “competent ignition source” in the area from which the explosion emanated.

The report recommended that Freeport develop a PSV testing procedure to include the use of car seals and considering formal training in same; consider performing a VIP alarm rationalization; and consider a complete review of tank-farm operating procedures."
Einstein gave the same test to students every year. When asked why he would do something like that, "Because the answers had changed."
 
I suspect that part of the root cause is more elementary than the technical errors. It appears that some of these LNG terminals are primarily managed as investment vehicles that are never considered wholey as a permanent part of a credible corporation, as might an oil refinery owned by one of the seven sisters. A group of investors form an LLC to obtain a site construction permit, the economics are evaluated, and the developing site is bought , sold ,or traded to optimize the investment advantages, and the design and operation are carried along without true ownership. As financial issues become the primary trump card, every decision to staff and train the operators is viewed by modern management as another method to trim costs and maximize profits. In such an enviroment , the safety of the operation would increasingly depend on the independent regulators and inspectors and less responsibility is felt to be integral to the group of independent LLC partners.

"...when logic, and proportion, have fallen, sloppy dead..." Grace Slick
 
"LL" says a lot about their corporate perspective.

Yes, those are not technical errors. I would count none of them in the technical (design) error category.
While undesirable, a vent line that can be isolated is quite a common design practice.
Closed relief vent isolation valves (all of then not locked open) are an operational/admin error as are the others. This is another episode of no corporate safety culture.

Einstein gave the same test to students every year. When asked why he would do something like that, "Because the answers had changed."
 
Lack of safeguards to warn operators of increasing vacuum insulated pipe (VIP) temperature.
That sounds like a technical problem, doesn't it?

According to the report “more than one” control-board operator said that they were either not familiar with or had never seen the plant’s operating procedures
The context isn't completely clear, but that sure doesn't sound good. An operator... had never seen the plant's operating procedures?!?

...I guess he just did what Billy Bob told him to do!

=====================================
(2B)+(2B)' ?
 
I'll give you that one. However there is such a thing as too many alarms. Pressure rise is coincident with increasing temperatures; they happen together, and it wasn't temperature that burst the pipe. Temperature is also not a reliable indicator of hi pressure, since that might vary by up to 100 degrees with the same pressure, depending on if it was winter or summer. Hi pressure should have been sufficient warning. High Temp probably would have just been another ignored alarm. Plus a man with two watches never knows the time. Hi Pressure is primary. If anyone was paying attention, they would have caught the rising pressure. Surely there were horns sounding on that, but if a trees falls in the forest ... would Billy hear anything? If he heard it, he'd have to look in the op manual. How much you wanna bet that it doesn't exist? Even if it does, it should be on the operator's desk. I mean there's just no excuse for this.

Einstein gave the same test to students every year. When asked why he would do something like that, "Because the answers had changed."
 
@Davefiz, i guess there are some managers that got a lesson in the cost of low safety? Question is if the learned anything from that lesson :-(

€electricete,

I guess you can always claim that _any_ error has a root cause in your management system. In this case the obvious question would be "why did the management system allow the lack of this safeguard"?


--- Best regards, Morten Andersen
 
Freeport LNG gets FERC permission for commercial restart

"Freeport LNG Development LP has received US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approval to resume commercial operations at its 15-million tonne/year (tpy) plant on Quintana Island, Tex. Authorization provides for the immediate full return to service of one 5-million tpy liquefaction train (Train 3), that has already restarted, and incremental restart and full return to service of a second train (Train 2)."

Completion now set for May.

[pull]=omeda|7988I6312067A1B

--Einstein gave the same test to students every year. When asked why he would do something like that, "Because the answers had changed."
 
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