Boeing again pt2. 14

[Alistair_Heaton]

https://www.eng-tips.com/viewthread.cfm?qid=515237

first thread

 

[3DDave]

No, they wanted a more efficient plane which could be delivered quicker than the more efficient Airbus planes.

The specifically wanted a 737 variant. How is this difficult to understand? American Airlines and Southwest in particular didn't want to be pushed to Airbus at all. They wanted the 737 for commonality with their existing fleet rather than starting from scratch with Airbus.

 

[3DDave]

"...which are a product of the American voters."

I'm not so sure they have anything to say when it comes to the government.

They vote for the "make the government fail" candidates. That's a pretty big say.

 

[dik]

From a slate of 'used car salesmen'.

 

[3DDave]

My uncle, a surgeon, ran for a US House seat. Didn't get elected. Plenty of candidates aren't used car salesmen, but the public often won't pick them.

A few non-salesmen do manage to get in - Rep Katie Porter, for example. A different kind of surgeon - one skilled at taking apart opponents with a marker and facts. AOC is another. But then there is Marjorie Taylor Green and her ilk.

 

[dik]

Boeing is doing so badly of late that they are going to have to fire 30 politicians...

 

[IRstuff]

A few non-salesmen do manage to get in - Rep Katie Porter, for example. A different kind of surgeon - one skilled at taking apart opponents with a marker and facts. AOC is another. But then there is Marjorie Taylor Green and her ilk.

It's possible that most politicians start off as non-salesmen, but (de)evolve into salesmen over time, because that's what's often required. We've got a local politician, who might have been clean, a long time ago, but now is completely comfortable in character assasination ads against her opponents.

 

[LionelHutz]

The specifically wanted a 737 variant. How is this difficult to understand?

They wanted to purchase the cheapest plane to operate. Boeing proposed the Leap powered 737 varients to meet their wants and keep Airbus from getting the business. If Boeing had actually started development of the 737 replacement 15-20 years ago like they should have so it was ready by around 2010-15, and they didn't screw it up with the efficiency, then those airlines would be purchasing it.

 

[LittleInch]

The specifically wanted a 737 variant. How is this difficult to understand? American Airlines and Southwest in particular didn't want to be pushed to Airbus at all. They wanted the 737 for commonality with their existing fleet rather than starting from scratch with Airbus.

The real issue from this though which was contributory to all the MCAS issues etc was yes they wanted a 737 variant, but this time didn't want it to vary enough that they needed to retrain all their pilots in a SIM. This constraint was pushed beyond the limit of what most people would say was the same system and forced a lot of improvements and modifications to be deleted in order for the Max versions to not require it to be a different type approval. So ok they retained many things which a new design probably wouldn't have, but had to adapt their modifications to meet this one hour on an I pad training requirement on the differences between an NG and MAX.

SW it was I think who then also wanted all the screens to mimic the old analogue instruments to make it even less "new" than it should have been.

For me that was one of the biggest issues which at some point fairly early on someone at Boeing needed to stand firm and say no, we need to make changes which means it is a different type approval and will require SIM sessions inorder to update this air frame to modern day standards.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

it was the American market that wanted a rehashed 737 to maximise the MBA bonus system.

The rest of the world could see the issues and also the very transparent ploys of killing off the competition.

And the likes of Ryanair beat them at there own game.

I think I read somewhere that the sum total of the 737 program is now negative. And that's not including the MAX 10 certification. If that doesn't get certified and planned sales fulfilled the 737 program will have gone from outstanding engineering profitable success to a complete disaster in under 5 years.

All because a USA MBA didn't want to pay for sim training.

Said MBA very quickly decided to buy Airbus when things went wrong.

 

[IRstuff]

All because a USA MBA didn't want to pay for sim training.

That's only a tiny piece of it. Regardless of the sim training cost itself, the ultimate issue with MAX was its instability because they grew the engines and moved the wings and CG, etc., etc.. That's coupled with bad control firmware and a complicit FAA that allowed Boeing to claim that it was essentially the same plane and therefore required no new training.

Had the plane been deemed a new plane, it would have required requalification of everything, and they would have had to fix all the problems that would have been uncovered.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

I was meaning a Airline MBA.

I don't disagree with you though.

The real crux though is the short gear legs which are so you can hand load the cargo holds.

I wonder if Boeing ever paid the contract penalty when the brought in mandatory sim differences training and checking.

And basically all the problems getting the MAX 10 certified is them fixing issues dating back to the NG certification.

 

[3DDave]

That's only a tiny piece of it. Regardless of the sim training cost itself, the ultimate issue with MAX was its instability because they grew the engines and moved the wings and CG, etc., etc.. That's coupled with bad control firmware and a complicit FAA that allowed Boeing to claim that it was essentially the same plane and therefore required no new training.

Had the plane been deemed a new plane, it would have required requalification of everything, and they would have had to fix all the problems that would have been uncovered.

The CG didn't move. The wings are the primary reference so they cannot move. The thrust line went up a little, reducing instability due to thrust. Moving the nacelle made a slight decrease in the stick vs. AoA increase at high AoA, which is what MCAS was designed to offset with a slight decrease in effective elevator ability. At no point was MAX unstable., not even close.

The plane did require training. What it did not require was re-qualification of the pilots. Nothing that happened in the two accidents was beyond the existing training to handle. What was a problem was pilots not paying attention to existing training as was proved by the first crew that flew 90 minutes to a safe landing after someone finally remembered the switches provided for cutting out a problem with trim, switches that had been in place for 737s over 50 years or more of design life.

As to "fix all the problems" the requalification would have been to replace systems on the plane that had never been problems with all new systems. It would not have, for example, done anything about failing to put all the fasteners back in to hold a door in place.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

They had been in place for the last 50 years but operated differently to previous 737 versions.

Previous versions you could kill the automatics while retaining the ability to use electric trim.

Max either switch killed both automatics and electric trim.

To me they should have removed one of them to highlight the difference in operation.

But then they would have had to document the differences including mcas.

 

[3DDave]

Alistair - the required procedure for the last 30 years was to cut off both switches rather than to take time to diagnose whether it was a failure in the automatics or the wiring in the control column. That was the training.

There was no difference for the procedures for the MAX.

They could not remove one of them to highlight the difference because there was no change in the procedure.

It's clear that the ET302 pilots never understood what the trim switches actually did; they would never have understood the change in the trim cutout switches which they misused.

 

[waross]

It's clear that the ET302 pilots never understood what the trim switches actually did; they would never have understood the change in the trim cutout switches which they misused.

And this caused Boeing to mislead the FAA how, Dave?

 

[3DDave]

The FAA wasn't in the cockpit, wasn't their Chief Pilot, wasn't their CAA, wasn't their owner/operator, wasn't their government.

At the time of ET-302 everything necessary to adapt to the failure of the AoA vane was published in what would have been obvious terms to anyone who read it.

There has been no evidence that the FAA would have done anything different in the certification process besides look at the fact that wheel trim was 100% capable of controlling the trim, that it would instantly stop the MCAS input, that holding the trim wheel would stop the trim, that switches to disable trim were and had always been available.

What the FAA and Boeing did not know is that pilots would rather pull 100 pounds of trim on a wheel that normally takes 2 fingers to maneuver with than push a functioning trim button with their thumb. What they especially didn't know was that when the procedure says - if you turn it off, leave it off - that there are pilots who would then turn it back on and leave it on.

In addition the FAA was clearly in the mode of willful ignorance by the FAA as it would have been trivial to include the FAA on the electronic sign-off for the 737 MAX software where the exact cause and use was described. It would have cost them 0 hours of direct oversight until that landed in their e-mail and the FAA chose not to request it.

The alternative to getting a notification was to send the FAA 10,000 pages of detailed meeting notes and various software tests and all the data from the flight tests, and some summary (the sort that is being complained was inadequate,) instead of just looking at the software to see what changed. Because all those 10,000 pages may not represent what was actually done, they are, to the regulator, garbage. If they don't understand the change, they don't sign off until they do. I think they would have looked at it and not realized that some other error path would get to this that involved a false stall warning. However, there is already a procedure in place to handle air-speed difference which is the main indicator that a stall warning is false, so what would they do then?

I think the FAA would have approved it no matter what other process steps were included because dealing with a fault ought to be trivial to anyone who understands how important trim is.

 

[waross]

The pilot's mistakes don't absolve Boeing from a multitude of sins.
The pilots paid for their mistakes with their lives.
But Boeing is Deemed "Too big to fail" and will continue to live on.

 

[3DDave]

If I get a blender that will detonate if I put orange juice in it and I see on TV that a blender was reported to have exploded from having orange juice put into it, I do not run out, buy some orange juice and put it into my blender while saying that the blender maker is at fault for following explosion, particularly if the coverage also noted that there was an "allow orange juice" switch that prevents the blender from exploding from orange juice being put into it.

I would hope that the aviation community is a little more organized than would be the case for a blender.

Ethiopian was told where the switches were and were told a new version of software would be available to avoid the need to use the switches.

They chose to neither use the switches nor to wait, but ran right out and sold tickets to the passengers.

 

[Sym P. le]

Whoa whoa whoa!! I just bought orange juice!

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

The trim forces and window of recoverable out of trim condition has changed considerably in that 50 years.

So much so that its on the list that's preventing the MAX 10 being certified.

I also think the FAA would have certified pretty much anything Boeing asked them to.

And Boeing ran out and sold a not fit for use aircraft.