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Boeing again pt2. 14

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Set a Google alert for blenders and orange juice.

At least in the aviation business the maker contacts their customers directly to tell them when a problem is found, which Boeing did.

That's why you should send in the warranty card, even when you know the warranty has terms that will never be met, like returning the item in the original packaging.
 
This having the back ground support of the OEM is one of the biggest worries about the Boeing issues.
 
I think you're pretty close... and no one is criminally liable... a sad state of affairs.
 
Some attitudes here mirror Boeing MBA management's attitude as part of the problem with Boeing.
 
the current method of stopping failure of the cowls due over heating while the de-icing system is on for the engines for the MAX

Is....turn them off after 5 mins manually.

This last week has been very icy in Europe between FL300 and landing in cloud.

For us Cowls are operating taxing when temp under 10 degs C and visible moisture so they will be on doing there thing for the first 20 mins after engine start. I suspect the MAX and neo engines are the same. And the last 25 mins of flight...

So we are into lets hope the pilots do something and don't get distracted by something else.
 
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the current method of stopping failure of the cowls due over heating while the de-icing system is on for the engines for the MAX

Is....turn them off after 5 mins manually.
Brilliant. Some kind of duty cycle to go with that, e.g. 5 on, 5 off?
 
I presume so...

But pilots have a habit of running out of fuel dealing with other checklists. And icing conditions is when unreliable air speed, AoA etc can start all of which take longer than 5 mins to sort out.

But if they are overloaded and don't turn back on again and they crash its only there own fault because they have been sent a memo.
 
The most hilarious part of "they have been sent a memo" is the PIA 8303 crew was sent a memo about putting the gear down before making an over speed, over steep landing.

Clearly that crash was not a crew failure but the entire Airbus philosophy that put them in that dire position. Time to ground every Airbus for their faulty process.
 
The memo is temporary. It's one of the many things delaying certification of the max 10.

It will also have to be fixed on the produced aircraft.
 
I was at a remote grass strip in the Moskito Coast.
I watched a King Air come in.
It held a few feet above the ground for quite a distance and then gained altitude and did a go-round.
It came in a second time with the gear down.
These boys were slow learners.
Two days later they forgot again and bellied in in front of the control tower in the city.
 
I suppose the disconnect is this:

I think if there is a control on the plane the pilots should be required to know what it does and how to use it and if there is an indicator they should be able to read it and understand it.

Others think that there are many controls and indicators on the plane the pilots need know nothing about and if those controls and indicators are required to safely operate the plane it's not the pilot's fault for not knowing them, but the maker who just told them what they are for is solely to blame.
 
No need for simulators at all, Dave?
but the maker who just told them what they are for is solely to blame.
Not solely to blame but given their crashed safety culture, a better attitude by Boeing management would have avoided a lot of deaths.
After the first crash, Boing should have accepted that there was a serious problem not only with the plane but with their abbreviated training.
Aplogize all you want, Dave, it won't change MacBoing's share of the guilt nor excuse their broken safety culture.
 
The disconnect is the complete disconnect from any human performance criteria or theory. Nevermind practical.

But Boeing have paid for that in money and the pax and crew with thier lives.
 
Expected response:

Airplane makers should never make any errors and even after the errors are exposed and they are working to correct the errors, it's still their fault for any further use of the product that has an adverse result. They should perform 100% destructive testing to ensure the parts were made correctly and personally interview anyone who is or may be a pilot to find out how they would handle any sort of stress. Every plane should come outfitted with at least one dozen manufacturer reps to hold the hands of the pilots from the time they wake up until the time they are walking off the plane.

Never part of the response:

Any concrete indication that would make them say "OK, that makes up for it."

I think there is nothing that ever will satisfy them.

It's not about safety and hasn't been. There are 200-300 crashes in the USA every year, but that's of no concern. Only Boeing.
 
I was right. Those responses while I was typing the followup are exactly as expected.

"No need for simulators at all, Dave?"

Ethiopian had 2 MAX simulators and used neither of them to work through the Lion Air scenario to ensure they had pilots who understood and would follow the procedures.
 
"The disconnect is the complete disconnect from any human performance criteria or theory. Nevermind practical."

Is it complete? Which theory is that?

Boeing paid because Ethiopia lied.
 
How long have you been working for the Boeing PR team, Dave?
 
As expected.

No concrete indication that would make them say "OK, that makes up for it."
 

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