Hard Rock Hotel under construction in New Orleans collapses... 119

[ldeem]

Reading the OSHA document I noticed the connection design is called out as a Willful violation and is the largest part of the penalty.

OSHA also calls for abatement of the violation and lists several options which seem to be mostly redesign. I wonder what the point of that is since the building has collapsed and I assume never to be rebuilt with the same plans. Maybe a way to correct the plans (which are sealed and I suppose technically could be used for construction) or force Heaslip to redesign the connections and prove the original design deficient?

 

[bones206]

The western side exterior bay was not tied into a rigid portion of the structure for floors 9 through 15 between column lines 1 and 9.

Not sure what to make of that statement.

 

[JAE]

bones206,
Per my post above (way above) - a section of the floor (that collapsed) had no real steel connection to the main part of the building other than a small strip of deck-slab.

 

[bones206]

I guess I’m hung up on OSHA’s language as to why that is a violation in and of itself. Was that specific framing connection point necessary for global frame stability? I wish they provided more context.

 

[Rabbit12]

Does OSHA alleging design inadequacy seem odd to anyone else? In this case I certainly suspect they are correct. Does OSHA hire engineers to determine if the design was incorrect?

 

[Vance Wiley]

It is understood that OSHA is interested in workplace safety. This project has pretty well earned an "unsafe" label.
But was it unsafe due to inadequate shoring? Some action of the Contractor? Lack of stability at an intermediate phase? (ie Pedestrian Bridge and ABC). Inadequate structural design? Improper erection procedures? Bad materials?
Many possibilities. Much yet unknown.
For OSHA to call design inadequacy does seem a bit strange, particularly at this point. Politics? Shaping the battlefield? Benjamins in the wind?

 

[3DDave]

I think that OSHA has engineering studies and I think there are references to peer reviewed analysis that will likely be released with a final report. Unlike NTSB I'm not sure if OSHA has as it's goal to expose so much of the steps that led to the disaster - right or wrong, it seems they are generally a generator of regulations and enforcer against rule infractions. I think they will release something but it's not their primary mission.

 

[ldeem]

The abatement options OSHA provides are all very specific and seem that they would have to have been written by an engineer familiar with the design. For example the concrete density note which seems like the design was based on lightweight concrete but the job ended up with standard concrete. Or whoever spec'd the component (I assume decking) looked at the wrong table?

 

[OHIOMatt]

For some reason, I can’t find the source now, but at one point I read that ASCE was working with OSHA to provide engineering support.

This must result in a publicly available report. I would expect the report to contain calculations and computer modeling. In addition, the report needs to focus and report on contractual relationships a and communication during the project.

One thing that has bugged the hell out of me from the beginning is the video of the buckled shore posts. That was a scream that something was wrong. I would like to see the communication chain. Somebody had to have said “stop”, something’s wrong.

 

[Rabbit12]

That would make sense. Some of the accusations in the OSHA fine would take some engineering to determine.

 

[NOLAscience]

I wonder if architectural requirements influenced the design choices highlighted by JAE above. I'd love to know more about the emails, phone calls, and meetings between the structural engineers and the architect.

 

[Ansys A user]

Does anyone know how soon OSHA will issue its report on the incident?

 

[FacEngrPE]

I suspect the engineering report will eventually be posted in OSHA's repository of "Construction Incidents Investigation Engineering Reports"

https://www.osha.gov/construction/engineering

.

It's not posted yet, and I know of no standing schedule, an abbreviated look at dates indicates between 3 and 18 months of an incident is a reasonable guess.

While waiting you can read about many ugly construction incidents described in detail. Perhaps you can encourage your colleagues to avoid situations that caused these incidents.

Fred

 

[BadgerPE]

I suspect the engineering report will eventually be posted in OSHA's repository of "Construction Incidents Investigation Engineering Reports"

https://www.osha.gov/construction/engineering

.

It's not posted yet, and I know of no standing schedule, an abbreviated look at dates indicates between 3 and 18 months of an incident is a reasonable guess.

While waiting you can read about many ugly construction incidents described in detail. Perhaps you can encourage your colleagues to avoid situations that caused these incidents.

I haven't read them yet, but while browsing the list of accidents, I couldn't help but notice that 7 out of the first 9 most recent incidents listed occurred in Florida? There were a few wind related ones, but most were not related to extreme wind events. Any ideas why this is?

 

[JAE]

It probably has something to do with "Florida Man".

 

[thebard3]

I would suspect that any reports from OSHA will be preliminary until they are able to perform forensics on some of the structural elements to confirm their theories. That would have to wait until everything is on the ground as I think nobody is allowed to be working inside the structure.

Brad Waybright

It's all okay as long as it's okay.

 

[Vance Wiley]

Has anyone documented or guessed at the floor to floor dimension of this structure?
The layout suggests a corridor in the zone with no structural steel connecting the segments of the building (noted in the quote as a small strip of deck-slab).
There is always a pressure to reduce heights and therefore costs of the exterior wrap and vertical transportation and utilities. Add the demands for utilities down the corridors and many buildings are severely congested in the overhead of corridors. Eliminating structural members across the corridor ceiling reduces the height demand. A likely cause for no structural steel ties across the corridor.
Too bad a computer program cannot identify such a weakness in a design.
Like most failures, somewhere someone did not focus on the big picture. And like many failures, this may have been a very opportune time to reveal this deficiency. Think of the lives lost had it happened at 3 AM with full occupancy.

 

[bones206]

I'll wait for the full report to come out, but I'm not yet convinced that the lack of framing in the central corridor was a contributing factor to the collapse. If anything, it might have helped prevent the collapse of the rest of the building by virtue of the weakened/perforated plane that it created.

Just as a thought experiment, let's just assume that the building had sufficiently beefy members, connections and decking such that a no "local" failures occurred. But the overall framing scheme remained the same. Would we still expect a global collapse/failure of building based on the framing scheme alone? I'm curious if there was a global stability weakness in the design or if it was just a local failure leading to classic progressive collapse.

 

[JAE]

bones206.
I think we discussed the idea of a "fuse" above, which you properly pointed out. I think that is a valid observation.

I posted that image not to suggest the lack of framing across that corridor was a cause.....but rather that the lack of framing helped explain why the front section fell, but not the rear section.

 

[bones206]

JAE it sounds like we are on the same page. But the fact that OSHA seems to be singling it out is puzzling to me, as it is not immediately obvious to me why that would be a violation.