hokie66 - I think once the fire took hold it was the cladding, then the insulation and then the cladding again. It got to the point where the polyethylene was melting 3 stories up in advance of the flames and flowing down in to the fire. Constantly feeding the heat to drive the polyol out of the PUR insulation. The polyol raised the temperature of the fire, which then completely consumed the slower burning polyethylene & supplied the heat to melt the PE in advance of the fire. The fire didn't just burn upwards it dripped like a candle & burnt downwards as well.
Dik - The main culprits would seem to be KCTMO, possibly RBKC's Rock Fielding-Mellen & Nicholas Paget-Brown & the RBKC's Building Officials. Rydon & the cladding contractor has submitted a change in the size of the windows (smaller than the opening) and it lingered at the Building Permit Dept. I can only assume it was eventually permitted. This is when compartmentalization was compromised. I assume someone will get thrown under the bus. Probably the Cladding contractor. If the Building Dept actually approved the use of a bituminous mastic membrane as a weather seal in the gaps between the window frame & the structure, then the building official & the contractor should both meet justice, because the use of that material in that location was just insane. Clearly the entire cladding industry in the UK was heading towards this disaster but using a bituminous mastic membrane in a makeshift compartmentalization work around with other combustible materials was utterly abandoning safety. I'm still not sure how Studio-E fits in after Rydon was assigned the work.
I agree - no criminal charges were ever brought after the Piper Alpha disaster, even though the public inquiry was a damning indictment of Occidental as the platform operator and of the regulatory framework which the offshore industry operated within at the time. So far my impression is that the Grenfell inquiry is going to be rather less rigorous and wide-ranging than the Cullen inquiry into Piper Alpha, although I hope I am proven wrong.
it is high time that the engineering professiona in the Uk become regulated with educational and experience requirements just as in the US and Canada. At the moment anyone can call himself an engineer and design things and approve drawings etc.
The Guardian link is pretty good. Can't bring myself to click on the Daily Mail.
If even half of what Dr Lane has noted so far is proven then it is pretty damning for both the contractor and the building management company responsible for the works.
Attached are links to the Expert hearings & reports. There are a total so far, of 3 Expert Hearings & 4 Expert Reports.
I have watched two of the hearings 3 to 4 hours each.
Dr Barbara Lane's presentation: Part 1 of the video covers Building Standards & Grenfell's building history, while part 2 applies the standards to the work done to Grenfell.
Professor Luke Bisby's expert report, also in two parts. In part 1 discusses fire generation & methods of evaluation material combustion, while part 2 applies what was discussed in part 1 to Grenfell; much as did Dr Barbara Lane. You could skip part one of both of these, although they make good classroom material on the subjects covered.
The links also contain a link to a pdf of the report. I recommend the pdf. They are definitely worth a look and contain many "As Built" and detailed post fire photos.
To add some clarity to the reports of polystyrene in the facade, it appears the Window In-fill Panels & the Fan Opening Insert were an ACM material (Aluglaze) Link made up of 2ea - 2mm sheets of aluminum & 25mm of polystyrene. Many of these Aluminum In-fill sheets fell from Grenfell during the fire. One suspicion is that the fan may have fallen out of this panel during the initial kitchen fire & the fan opening was the earliest route of flame to the exterior.
Comparing Dr Barbara Lane's determination of where Fire Block SHOULD have been and where fire block was placed, just over half as much was used as standards require and though detailed; was missing in vertical positions on a number of the columns.
No form of fire-stopping was found in any of the window assemblies, where the window stopped short of the column. The only consideration was for waterproofing the gap with an EPDM membrane and additional insulation board. Forensic deconstruction frequently found the insulation had been omitted. The interior of the gap was filled with a 10mm strip of uPVC that started to lose strength at about 50C. This same uPVC was used in the interior window surrounds and one of the reports show a photo from a partially damaged apartment with the uPVC in a frozen state of melting.
Professor Luke Bisby speaks a great deal to the rapid vertical advancement of the fire, followed by the melting, downward & horizontal envelopment. His link has a compilation video that gives a time position to the many video and show the advancement of the fire from very early in the fire to full conflagration.
Looking at Professor Niamh Nic Daeid's report it becomes clear that by the time the fire crew in unit 16 finally started to apply water to the kitchen blaze, the facade had been ignited for 1 or 2 minutes.
(scroll the link for pdf)
Dr Barbara Lane Link
Professor Luke Bisby's expert report Link
Professor Niamh Nic Daeid's presentation Link
Professor Jose L Toreros Expert Report Link
I went through Dr. Lane's report earlier. I assume that none of the reports points a finger at the agency involved in the decision to use flammable materials. There is no responsibility for the deaths of the 71 people.
As I understand it, in Phase 1 of the Inquiry the expert witnesses merely report their findings according to the scope of work they have been assigned. Phase 2 will be around October of this year. I'll be curious to see what form this takes. I can't help but think this looks very bad for anyone at the RBKC Planning & Building Control, who had anything to do with the window assemblies.
The smaller window size was submitted & accepted on an application for a minor change, not in need of re-submission under a new permit & a full review of the project, so perhaps this meant that some of the procedural review wasn't required to be reassessed. As in, perhaps it didn't have to fall under the eyes of the people responsible for Fire Safety.
It is odd that it took at least an extra month for the RBKC Planning & Building Control to release the change of the windows for construction, only for the as built result to be so absent of a fundamental element of building safety. We are living in very frustrating times where the public is being told, "If you see something, say something", yet people who studied a professional discipline and have been vetted, credentialed & have made oaths are given salvation for having turned a blind eye to glaring problems. All under the excuse that, it wasn't within the scope of their work or that the error was a procedural fault & thus not mine. It isn't that such circumstances don't happen, it is just that more often than not more than one turned a blind eye.
Oops! Architectural expert sacked from Grenfell inquiry. Link
He obviously knew. Something seriously wrong with him to go so far in such a sensitive matter.
