A quick google suggests there is a lot of manual sub-systems(even with automated systems) valves, controls, gauges, etc. that go into controlling viscosity and condition of the heavy oil fuels, low sulfur fuels, distillate fuels, etc., prior to reaching the combustion chamber of the large container ship engines, generators, boilers, etc. Then there are the monitoring sub-systems to dial in the fuel to air ratio for the particular fuel in use, and load.
It was Jan 1, 2015 when MARPOL Annex VI ultra-low-sulphur fuel oil regulations that changed rules on fuels. I read somewhere in this thread that this ship was manufactured around that time. Question is was it built before of after the new rules? Did it have to be retrofitted after new rules, and perhaps multiple times since it was manufactured to meet changing environmental rules and fuels or was it grandfathered?
Could the sudden loss of load on DGR3 and 4, be the cause of the black smoke due to loss of all electrical loads on main generators?
I believe this article also mentions turning off one generator when loads are too low for two generators, to ensure turbo is spun up sufficiently to create proper fuel to air ratio. Or did a ship mate close or open the wrong manual control device, at that the wrong time, in preparation for open sea conversion to heavy fuel oil?
I have highlighted the load scenario in the screen shot below, and provide link to the Marine Insight article.
I have also included a MAN Dec 2014 Service letter concerning low sulfur fuels and low viscosity distillate fuels.
[URL unfurl="true"]https://res.cloudinary.com/engineering-com/image/upload/v1716145445/tips/sl2014-593_uwhp83.pdf[/url]
Bottom line is it appears effects of running multiple fuels and tuning of engines to run on different fuels is a very complex process, and perhaps with a lot of manual intervention to control the process. So plenty of room for human error, in spite of automation systems, just like the exhaust damper was incorrectly close in port?