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Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part XV 15

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Sym P. le

Mechanical
Jul 9, 2018
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Please allow me to continue the previous thread (Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part XIV) as the prior is getting unwieldy.

For those who have lost track of the discussion, my summary is that we have most recently moved into a discussion of the progression of nodal region deterioration of members 11, 12 and the deck as it pertains to the physical placement of the structure in its permanent location, then detensioning of PT rods in member 11, and then prior to retensioning of same. Epoxybot was able to connect the timeline of texts sent by Kevin Hanson inquiring of necessary supplies prior to detensioning with the timestamp on photos indicating significant deterioration prior to detensioning. I was reviewing documentation trying to narrow down on this timeline to confirm this critical detail with the implication that analysis contributed to the NTSB review has conflated events and attributed them to post-detensioning occurrences thus leading further analysis astray.

I have also posted what I consider evidence of compression failure of member 11 as the leading event of the collapse immediately after completion of retensioning PT rods in member 11. This includes questionable reinforcing design and deformation patterns in exposed rebar post-collapse.

To forward my own hypothesis, it is that two failure mechanisms were at play, one was the nodal region degeneration, and the second was the member 11 degeneration as it came into the nodal region. Although they played into each other, the weaker nodal region allowed the deck to detach from the node but the structure was able to rely on the connection of the diaphragm with the repurposed member 12 (i.e. a connection not including the deck). Meanwhile, the demand on the flawed member 11 grew and the structure collapsed when 11 failed just above the node.

P.S. With this new and more nuanced timeline, it allows the identification of three significant events to member 11:

1 - Overloading upon removal of shoring followed by release when mounted on transporters,
2 - Overloading upon setting on piers followed by release with detensioning,
3 - Overloading upon retensioning of PT rods followed by collapse.​

 
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Sym.p.le said:
I suspect they would have to give a little tug on the PT rod in order to release the nut.

They would- but done correctly, this would apply no more load to the PT rod than had been applied during the initial tensioning. If there was any creep of the concrete loaded by the rod, then the retensioning process would apply (very slightly) less strain then the first tensioning did. This all assumes correct use of the tools to tension the rods, which is difficult/impossible to confirm after the fact.

Sym.p.le said:
Is it possible that they engaged the jack before realising oil was required and if so did that trigger the cracking?

Based on what I know about this type of equipment, no. The jack can't apply the correct tension to the rod if the pump runs out of oil; in that case they would need to either completely detension the rod to fill the reservoir and then re-apply tension, or they would need to stop tensioning and fill the reservoir in the middle of the process. Which of the two depends on the specific design of the hydraulic ram being used, and whether or not it has high pressure isolation valves on the supply connection. In either case as far as I can tell, the rods would stay within the limits of previously applied tension conditions (again assuming correct use of the tools which is impossible to truly confirm).
 
I agree with SwinnyGG's comments on hydraulic stressing.

I will just add a few comments:

As I recall from the collapse photographs back in 2018, the hydraulic system used for tensioning/de-tensioning the PT bars on this project was an electrically-operated SPX POWERTEAM pump with 4-way (3 position) valve and a double-acting center hole ram.

This was a very basic hydraulic setup where only one PT bar was stressed at a time, so no manifold was required for two or more rams. With only one pump and one ram, the valve would have been a 'tandem' center (as opposed to an 'open' or 'closed' center).

To add hydraulic fluid to a partially stressed tendons you would usually return the ram to zero (therefore re-engage the nut to the PT bar anchorage back to its previous load) fill up the reservoir and re-commence stressing, OR, park the pump valve in center HOLD position and add oil. You would NOT disconnect the hoses and remove the pump from the work area, fill up the pump and return it to service.

To de-tension a PT bar using a manual method, we usually conduct a lift-off test. The ram is first advanced by a distance greater than the bars elongation, under no pressure. With a bar wrench installed on the PT bar nut (inside the stressing stool) and whilst operator #1 is on the pump, operator #2 is applying a nominal force on the wrench, and as the ram takes up load the nut will partially turn when lift-off occurs, as indicated by operator #2. Operator #1 will be watching the pressure gauge and determine the magnitude of lift-off, and this value would usually be recorded. From there, the nut can be manually backed-off, upon which the ram will be returned and the PT bar de-tensioned.​
 
REPORT said:
Revise local agency program agreements to specify
that when structural cracks are initially detected during
bridge construction, the engineer of record, construction
engineering inspector, design-build firm, or local agency
that owns or is responsible for the bridge construction
must immediately close the bridge to construction
personnel and close the road underneath; fully support
the entire bridge weight using construction techniques
that do not require placing workers on or directly under
the bridge during installation; and restrict all pedestrian,
vehicular, and construction traffic on the bridge until the
complete support is in place and inspected.

What is a structural crack exactly? (as opposed to a non-structural crack) Does anyone have a good definition? What sort of cracking would trigger this requirement to declare a structural emergency?
 
Tomfh said:
What is a structural crack exactly? (as opposed to a non-structural crack)

This is why I emailed the Applied Technology Council, referencing this project and suggested they look at ATC-20 and prepare a program that addresses this point, regardless of cause. Too many engineers, it seems, simply don't see enough of the remedial side of concrete construction to know what they are looking at.
 
They should have defined it if it forms one of their recommendations. I had heard somewhere that it is cracking due to loads or support movement rather than the various other causes, but can't recall where.

The full report says "...structural cracking (beyond what sound engineering judgment considers acceptable)..."

It also quotes the Florida DOT specifications: "In general, nonstructural cracks are cracks 1/2 inch or less deep from the surface of the concrete; however, the Engineer may determine that a crack greater than 1/2 inch deep is nonstructural. In general, structural cracks are cracks that extend deeper than 1/2 inch. As an exception, all cracks in concrete bridge decks that are supported by beams or girders will be classified as nonstructural"

 
Those sort of definitions are what I’m wondering about. They’re extremely vague and boil down to saying that cracks in the structure are structural unless a structural engineer says they’re not. Which means what exactly? It still leaves open the question of what is a structural crack?

As an example - a regular flexural crack, or diagonal tension (shear) crack could satisfy all those definitions of structural cracking. They’re due to loads. They penetrate right through the structure. When does an engineer have to raise the red flag and deem them structural cracks?
 
Is there a critique of the NTSB's handling of this tragedy?

Rather than think climate change and the corona virus as science, think of it as the wrath of God. Feel any better?

-Dik
 
Tomfh said:
Those sort of definitions are what I’m wondering about. They’re extremely vague and boil down to saying that cracks in the structure are structural unless a structural engineer says they’re not. Which means what exactly? It still leaves open the question of what is a structural crack?

As an example - a regular flexural crack, or diagonal tension (shear) crack could satisfy all those definitions of structural cracking. They’re due to loads. They penetrate right through the structure. When does an engineer have to raise the red flag and deem them structural cracks?

Therein lies the rub, imo.

No matter how the NTSB or OSHA or ACI or ASME or ASHRAE or SAE or ANS or SPE or SAME or NAE or ASNT or NACE defines the term 'structural crack' ultimately, at some point, someone who knows what they're doing has to get boots in the mud and visually inspect, and make a call.

In my opinion the primary failure in this case was and is as much about communication and engineering ethics as it is or ever was about correctly estimating loads and accurately calculating their effects on a structure. That's still an 'engineering failure' very worthy of study and of action, but I don't believe it's something you can address completely with a change in regulation or definitions of terms.
 
Sym.P.Le said:
Needless to say, I find their continued efforts to restate their flawed findings rather disappointing.

Maybe I'm missing something because I haven't studied every single post in this thread.. but are you really that confident that a group of us doing many months of internet sleuthing have a better explanation than the NTSB does after they've spent an equal amount of time reviewing actual physical evidence and interviewing all parties?
 
Yes.

It's not so much the sleuthing as the openmindedness. The NTSB set out to explain how the node failed, full stop. They straight up say that is their sole objective in their report.

It's really hard to find obviously missing rebar (right next to the node) if you're not going to look for it.

Promise not to swear, but there are no hoop ties through the entire three feet of compression lap at the base of Member 11. It really is that obvious.
 
The initial crack photos of the day in question should have run up a 'really big' red flag...

Rather than think climate change and the corona virus as science, think of it as the wrath of God. Feel any better?

-Dik
 

I would suggest that could be a real possibility...

Rather than think climate change and the corona virus as science, think of it as the wrath of God. Feel any better?

-Dik
 
Sym.Pe.Le said:
Promise not to swear, but there are no hoop ties through the entire three feet of compression lap at the base of Member 11. It really is that obvious.

Yeah... and the NTSB report states several times that insufficient reinforcement is a major component of the root cause of the failure...

I guess I just remain unconvinced that the failure mode you're pushing is undoubtedly correct.
 
dik said:
The initial crack photos of the day in question should have run up a 'really big' red flag...

Totally agree. My point was that changing a definition of a term in the code doesn't resolve the issue of someone in the field recognizing a problem AND having the balls to make the call that no one wants to be made.

I'm not saying that the discussion about defining what a 'structural crack' is isn't valuable or necessary; it's both. But upgrading or clarifying that definition doesn't solve the real problem that resulted in the deaths here.
 
Viewing the pre-collapse photos, it always seemed clear to me that the node connection with the bridge deck was not cracked when it was inspected before the collapse. It was clearly already broken.

Brad Waybright

The more you know, the more you know you don't know.
 
SwinnyGG (Mechanical) said:
... the NTSB report states several times that insufficient reinforcement is a major component of the root cause of the failure

That could almost be a direct quote from the report, but again, the NTSB's only frame of reference for that statement is a lack of rebar within the node. They then go on to state that you couldn't possibly put enough rebar in the node to remedy the issue which is of their concern (the cold joint). They are distracted with their preconceptions and that is why their explanations are continually oddball and contradictory.

By carrying on with their chosen path, the educational aspect of this disaster their review is completely lost. The discussion about cracks is a case in point.

 

Just NTSB smoke and mirrors...

Rather than think climate change and the corona virus as science, think of it as the wrath of God. Feel any better?

-Dik
 

Concur wholeheartedly...

Rather than think climate change and the corona virus as science, think of it as the wrath of God. Feel any better?

-Dik
 
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