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Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part XV 15

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Sym P. le

Mechanical
Jul 9, 2018
1,081
Please allow me to continue the previous thread (Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part XIV) as the prior is getting unwieldy.

For those who have lost track of the discussion, my summary is that we have most recently moved into a discussion of the progression of nodal region deterioration of members 11, 12 and the deck as it pertains to the physical placement of the structure in its permanent location, then detensioning of PT rods in member 11, and then prior to retensioning of same. Epoxybot was able to connect the timeline of texts sent by Kevin Hanson inquiring of necessary supplies prior to detensioning with the timestamp on photos indicating significant deterioration prior to detensioning. I was reviewing documentation trying to narrow down on this timeline to confirm this critical detail with the implication that analysis contributed to the NTSB review has conflated events and attributed them to post-detensioning occurrences thus leading further analysis astray.

I have also posted what I consider evidence of compression failure of member 11 as the leading event of the collapse immediately after completion of retensioning PT rods in member 11. This includes questionable reinforcing design and deformation patterns in exposed rebar post-collapse.

To forward my own hypothesis, it is that two failure mechanisms were at play, one was the nodal region degeneration, and the second was the member 11 degeneration as it came into the nodal region. Although they played into each other, the weaker nodal region allowed the deck to detach from the node but the structure was able to rely on the connection of the diaphragm with the repurposed member 12 (i.e. a connection not including the deck). Meanwhile, the demand on the flawed member 11 grew and the structure collapsed when 11 failed just above the node.

P.S. With this new and more nuanced timeline, it allows the identification of three significant events to member 11:

1 - Overloading upon removal of shoring followed by release when mounted on transporters,
2 - Overloading upon setting on piers followed by release with detensioning,
3 - Overloading upon retensioning of PT rods followed by collapse.​

 
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SFCharlie,

Article doesn't start off well when it talks about a "cable stayed bridge", but does redeem itself a little later on.

Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.
 
Not only Structural engineering, but I suspect many other branches as well.

From the lessons learnt

• Due to the increasingly fragmented nature of the industry,
[highlight #FCE94F]it is often observed that engineering decisions are made by
non-engineers, without consulting competent engineers.[/highlight] This
results in significant safety risks due to non-engineers not
understanding the implications of their decisions. This is a
serious and widespread issue, which the industry needs to
recognise, and find a way to prevent from happening.

Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.
 
Try explaining that to the non-engineers.

Brad Waybright

The more you know, the more you know you don't know.
 
That lesson learned doesn't seem applicable to this situation. The non-engineers seemed to know there was a problem.
It was the EOR who said there wasn't a safety issue, even having observed the cracks the morning of the collapse.
 
I'm still surprised that the brand new Traffic Center, with all the bells & whistles, including being able to record from one's desktop, at the push of a button; failed to save a copy of the bridge collapse. There should have been an investigation and someone should have been fired. Their explanation for not being able to save a copy was a bald-faced lie.
 
LittleInch said:
it is often observed that engineering decisions are made by
non-engineers, without consulting competent engineers.

The non-engineers (stressing crew etc) were ringing the alarm bells and the all clear was given from the lead engineer with 30+ years bridge design experience.



Seminar said:
All parties apparently failed to recognise
the bridge was in danger when inspected
hours before the collapse.

What absolute nonsense. They knew, and were scrambling to fix it. They were feverishly designing steel straps to "capture" the bridge. You don't do that unless you know there are major problems. They chose not to shut the road for complex business/political reasons, not because they "failed to recognise" the problem.
 
epoxybot said:
I'm still surprised that the brand new Traffic Center, with all the bells & whistles, including being able to record from one's desktop, at the push of a button; failed to save a copy of the bridge collapse. There should have been an investigation and someone should have been fired. Their explanation for not being able to save a copy was a bald-faced lie.
What's even more surprising is that there was not even a large issue Raised about that.
 
That Alert is based on the NTSB report mostly, but I personally think the NTSB report missed the mark on a few points which leads to recommendations for change based on those flaws.
 
I think the question is why were the PT guys tensioning or de-tensioning without a qualified threshold inspector present, I have never seen a tendon tensioned with out a threshold inspector physically recording the PSI, the elongation at the wedge. It's not like you jack tendons randomly, at X amount of force the deck rises y, and the cable elongates Z
 
Keith_1 said:
I think the question is why were the PT guys tensioning or de-tensioning without a qualified threshold inspector present, I have never seen a tendon tensioned with out a threshold inspector physically recording the PSI, the elongation at the wedge. It's not like you jack tendons randomly, at X amount of force the deck rises y, and the cable elongates Z

You think a Threshold Inspector would have 'saved' the day and halted the stressing that the EoR requested?

My understanding is that Florida's Threshold Inspection is for buildings not bridges, where the FDoT inspections etc. would be applicable.

There was a third-party engaged on this project for site construction inspection/review.
 
As others have already emphasized: non-engineers were pointing out the signs of impending failure of the bridge while highly educated engineers were saying don't worry, everything is okay. To see structural trade organizations and publications cast blame on 'non-engineers' making decisions is disappointing. As it is clear and documented the collapse occurred while under the watch of the EOR and the storied FIGG Bridge Engineering firm. The structural engineering organizations and publications should be speaking out about group-think mentality and caution against acceptance of a person or company's reputation when a valid concern with safety is being reviewed.
 
Ingenuity

Yes, that it exactly what I am saying. Everyone on a jobsite either knows or is explicitly told not to stand above a tendon when it is being tensioned, and we clear the field in front of the work. I have personally seen a 7/8th inch tendon rip up a slab and shoot 30 feet and penetrate an adjacent building. Anyone that has actual field experience knows that tensioning a PT system has the potential to severely injure or cause the death of people in the direct vicinity.

Thankfully, ruptures and shoot outs are rare, but anyone with any experience, treats the tensioning of tendons with great respect.
 
You seem to be suggesting that the PT stressing crew were inexperienced when you make statements like: "not to stand above a tendon when it is being tensioned" and "we clear the field in front of the work".

I think the PT stressing crew at the time of collapse had "great respect" for the operations they were undertaking, and unfortunately one died and the PT foreman has suffered life-long brain injuries. Their fate was not due to any breach of safety protocols directly related to the PT stressing. They both fell 30' when the collapse occurred.

A inspector (of any description: be it threshold, bridge, DoT etc) had little to do with this collapse incident. I my opinion - and if it was my project - it would have been the EoR present during this specific stressing operation/s, but unfortunately he was no where to be seen.
 
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