Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants 9

[bones206]

Nuclear power plants are not designed to operate in war zones. What can be done to proactively shore up the safety systems of these plants in Ukraine?

Assuming Russia permitted the international community to bring equipment on-site uncontested, is there anything that could be used in a pinch to augment emergency power systems etc? When I got out of the nuclear industry in 2016, there were a lot of projects in the works for this type of “beyond design basis” scenario in response to Fukushima.

Hopefully IAEA is already being proactive about this and working in a contingency plan, but I’m interested in hearing thoughts from our community here.

 

[JohnRBaker]

Just think of Chernobyl...

John R. Baker, P.E. (ret)
Irvine, CA
Siemens PLM:
UG/NX Museum:

The secret of life is not finding someone to live with
It's finding someone you can't live without

 

[miningman]

There is absolutely nothing ever built or designed by man that will not eventually fail . All these supposedly safety functions only generate short term "peace of mind" Chernobyl was what , 40 years ago and Fukushima about 20 years ago. We must be due for another nuclear disaster sometinme soon.

 

[1503-44]

No Fukushima was 2011. At least 9 more years before the next one. fingers

A black swan to a turkey is a white swan to the butcher ... and to Boeing.

 

[RedSnake]

IAEA says Russian forces have switched off some mobile networks and the internet at Zaporizhzhia NPP.
Says there are issues with food supply at plant and IAEA cannot get "reliable information" about plant

“Logic will get you from A to Z; imagination will get you everywhere.“
Albert Einstein

 

[bones206]

I’m reading reports that Chernobyl has lost its connection to the grid.

 

[bones206]

According to this document:

https://snriu.gov.ua/storage/app/sites/1/docs/Stress-tests/National Report of Ukraine.pdf,

hydrogen levels in the spent fuel pools will reach the LEL in about 10 days if power is not restored. Presumably there is some backup power being supplied for the next 48 hours or so, but that is not necessarily a given since the plant is under control of the Russian military.

I can’t say what will happen if hydrogen levels are not brought under control, but my assumption is a massive explosion similar to what we saw at Fukushima, but probably much bigger with far more radiation shot into the environment.

 

[RedSnake]

IAEA: Ukraine has informed IAEA of power loss at Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, @rafaelmgrossi says development violates key safety pillar on ensuring uninterrupted power supply; in this case IAEA sees no critical impact on safety

“Logic will get you from A to Z; imagination will get you everywhere.“
Albert Einstein

 

[SuperSalad]

I'm having a tough time figuring out whether some of the things are modelling estimations or evaluations of existing systems, but if it is the latter, it seems they have a passive autocatalytic hydrogen absorption system to mitigate that accumulation that doesn't rely on electric power or pressurized air. I could easily be missing/misinterpreting some key information though.

- Andrew

 

[bones206]

SuperSalad - where are you seeing that? I see those systems mentioned for other plants in Ukraine (not Chernobyl), and in the containment buildings - not in the spent fuel pools.

edit: for reference, the Chernobyl-specific section begins on page 105 of the stress test report.

 

[Spartan5]

Is it time to secure some potassium iodide (if we haven’t already)? How much should each individual have on hand?

 

[1503-44]

Can we make it with fertiliser and sea water?

A black swan to a turkey is a white swan to the butcher ... and to Boeing.

 

[bones206]

I'm deeply disturbed by IAEA's response so far. No talk of staging equipment or materials for emergency repairs or power restoration. No pragmatic preparation for worst case scenarios. Just empty words and assurances. They need to realize that war has created a giant fucking hole in the swiss cheese failure model. They need to start using their imaginations and start mobilizing. Every single layer of safety mentioned in that report is based on the assumption of that fuel, materials and trained personnel are freely available. So they can't make statements like "there is no critical impact on safety", when the ENTIRE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION is no longer valid.

 

[RedSnake]

But as far as I know there is no aktive reactors in Chernobyl, wasn't everything put under a hood?

They lost the readings from the monitoring equipment 2 days ago.

I will ask my workmate he was there on vacation just 2 years ago, looking at the site and the surroundings...

“Logic will get you from A to Z; imagination will get you everywhere.“
Albert Einstein

 

[SuperSalad]

SuperSalad - where are you seeing that? I see those systems mentioned for other plants in Ukraine (not Chernobyl), and in the containment buildings - not in the spent fuel pools.

edit: for reference, the Chernobyl-specific section begins on page 105 of the stress test report.

Aha, I was mistaken. I was jumping around to various mentions of hydrogen concentration reduction systems in the document not realizing I had left the Chernobyl specific section. They do mention having back-up generators and since the main danger is from hydrogen accumulation I would think that power would go to those systems?

− time of power supply restoration from the electrical grid is the time of restoration
of normal electrical power supply of auxiliary systems with diesel generator
shutdown and will constitute from 1.5 to 2 hours in case electrical grid integrity is
not lost.

Again, maybe I'm misinterpreting, but I think they have the capability to avoid dangerous accumulations.

- Andrew

 

[bones206]

Disclaimer: If it seems as though I am being alarmist and having a panic attack, it's because I am. I apologize if I am causing anyone anxiety. The Russians have spent the last week and a half showing the world how impossibly incompetent and dysfunctional their military and leadership structure is. The fact that we are relying on them to not render a large swath of Eurasia uninhabitable for generations is really taking a toll on my mental health right now.

Back to technical analysis. I've annotated in red my thoughts:

5 Ch LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER AND LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK
5.1 Сh Loss of Electrical Power
5.1.1 Ch Loss of Off-site Power

The ChNPP site electrical power supply system is sufficiently reliable. Station blackout may occur in case of full failure of the electrical grid of Ukraine and loss of ChNPP
110/330/750 outdoor switchyard connections with the Central and Southwestern power systems and Kiev power center. This has now occured. The operating organization has reliable operating procedures for restoration of off-site electrical power. The operating personnel are regularly trained according to these procedures. The emergency diesel generators (EDG) of ChNPP Stage II can supply power to all loads needed to maintain levels in the cooling pools of power units and ISF-1, temperature of SFA storage, operation of ventilation systems and radiation monitoring of the ChNPP. DGs can be started up within 15 seconds. Only if personnel are allowed to do so. Personnel may be phsyically/metnally unfit at this point since they have been held hostage for over a week.

As of 30 June 2011, there are 75.6 tons of diesel fuel ensuring autonomous operation of two DGs at full load during 3.5 days, or operation of one DG during 7 days ensuring power
supply to makeup systems of SFA storage locations. This time is sufficient to arrange uninterrupted supply of diesel fuel. In wartime fuel supply is far from being a certainty. Especially considered the amount of Russian military equipment tht have been abandoned due to lack of fuel. Based on results of emergency training conducted with emergency personnel (Emergency Training-50Е “Full Loss of Power Supply to ChNPP Auxiliary Systems”), time required to restore power supply of units 1 and 2 from EDG-2 is equal to 42 minutes. This time is similar to the design time for unloading of one unit cooling pool in DN Ø100 pipeline rupture, which, taking into account the accepted conservative approach, confirms the sufficient time margin restoration for safety functions. So assuming no fuel resupply, systems will cease to function between 3.5 to 7 days from today.

5.1.2 Ch Loss of Off-site Power and Loss of the Ordinary Backup AC Power Source
Unit 3 batteries ensure operation of the radiological monitoring control board in terms of DC loads, emergency lighting, 0.4 and 6 kV control bus for circuit breakers. Therefore, based on the load, operation of the batteries is ensured for 22 hours (group 1) and 33 hours (group 2).

5.1.3 Ch Loss of Off-site Power and Loss of the Ordinary Backup AC Power Sources, and Loss of Permanently Installed Diverse Backup AC Power Sources
Power loss scenarios, including loss of off-site power, were considered in the stress tests. Loss of pool water cooling and hydrogen removal functions are the most critical scenarios
under loss of power. The following has been defined based on ChNPP stress tests results:
− in case of loss of pool water cooling function, SFA temperature will increase but will not exceed 70°С (under water presence in the cooling pool), and thus it will not cause an accident, Great news, except...
− if hydrogen removal function is lost, hydrogen concentration in the cooling pool will increase and achieve the lower explosive limit (4%) during 10 days according to the conservative calculations. Experimental studies at ISF-1 demonstrated that hydrogen concentration stabilizes at 0.2%.
If neither off-site power nor power from EDGs can be ensured, the operating organization has a mobile DG station (MDGS) and corresponding tested procedure for its connection and
power supply to ISF-1 loads. I think these are like the FLEX units I was advocating for earlier. Glad they have them, but they need fuel too. Considering all organizational and technical measures, time required to connect MDGS does not exceed 8 hours. Based on the results of tests conducted on 7 November 2011, it has been established that in case of ISF-1 blackout the existing MDGS can ensure:
− lighting of all ISF-1 rooms,
− operability of ISF-1 radiation monitoring system,
− operability of ISF-1 alarm and process monitoring systems,
− operability of ISF-1 SFP automatic makeup system,
− collection and release of leakages from under the lining of ISF-1 cooling pools, TBSC and trench by pumps of ISF-1 active drain treatment system.
No mention of hydrogen removal system for the MDGS

5.1.4 Ch Conclusion on the Adequacy of Protection against Loss of Electrical Power
Analysis of power loss performed in the framework ChNPP stress tests, conclusions and measures implemented based on the stress tests results (MDGS arrangement) are sufficient
and reasonable. Loss of power to units 1, 2, 3 and ISF-1 does not lead to accidents with nuclear fuel damage. The nuclear facility design envisages electrical power redundancy; layout and interunit connections ensure high reliability of nuclear facility auxiliary systems. At the same time, spent fuel design ensures hydrogen safety and there is a sufficient time margin for restoration of safety functions lost during an accident. They are basically saying the hydrogen threat is negated by the ability to secure diesel for the EDG's and the ability to restore conenction to the grid. Again, they did not consider the possibility of active war in this scenario so it is no longer a valid statement.
The actual time for restoration of power on-site is as follows:
− unit 3 and ISF-1 ≤15 sec (time of DG-2 startup),
− units 1 and 2 ~40 min (based results of emergency training performed with personnel (Emergency Training-50Е “Full Loss of Power Supply to ChNPP Auxiliary Systems”), time required to restore power supply of units 1 and 2 from DG-2 is 42 min),
− time of power supply restoration from the electrical grid is the time of restoration of normal electrical power supply of auxiliary systems with diesel generator shutdown and will constitute from 1.5 to 2 hours in case electrical grid integrity is not lost.

 

[SuperSalad]

Yeah I definitely see and understand your concerns.

- Andrew

 

[bones206]

I guess one possible silver lining is that this report was written in 2011. I would assume the reactivity has lessened somewhat since then, and the time required for the hydrogen gas would be longer than the 10 days postulated in the 2011 report. Or maybe I am grasping at straws here.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

here is a wind chart for Ukraine

https://windy.app/forecast2/spot/100052/Kiev+Ukraine/map

 

[RedSnake]

Could it be worse then the last time?
We just stopped measuring the cesium content in wild game and berries and mushroom's last year.

New encapsulation of reactor 4

Block 4 and the sarcophagus enclosed in their new protection.
On 17 September 2007, it was announced that a new steel foundation would replace the rapidly built sarcophagus built over the reactor shortly after the disaster. The new building was managed on site in November 2016. The project is funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Technical data
Reactor type, Net effect, Gross effect, Construction start, First network, Connection, Commercial operation, Closed down, Empty fuel, Notes
Chernobyl-1, RBMK-1000, 725 MW, 800 MW, 1970-03-01, 1977-09-26 ,1978-05-27, 1996-11-30, 2005-11, 1982 melted parts of the core
Chernobyl-2, RBMK-1000, 925 MW, 1000 MW, 1973-02-01, 1978-12-21, 1979-05-28, 1991-10-11, Closed after a fire in the turbine hall
Chernobyl-3, RBMK-1000, 925 MW, 1000 MW, 1976-03-01, 1981-12-03, 1982-08-06, 2000-12-15, 2007-06
Chernobyl-4, RBMK-1000, 925 MW, 1000 MW, 1979-04-01, 1983-12-22, 1984-03-26, 1986-04-26, Exploded
Chernobyl-5, [2] RBMK-1000 - 1000 MW, 1981-12-01 - - - Construction suspended
Chernobyl-6, [3] RBMK-1000 - 1000 MW, 1983-12-01 - - - Construction suspended

But I do agree Russian soldiers should stay away, they even managed to destroy the telecommunication so now they can't even use there own encrypted military communication systems, so now they have to use Uurainen sim cards to phone home to there commanders.



“Logic will get you from A to Z; imagination will get you everywhere.“
Albert Einstein

 

[bones206]

Imagine hundreds of millions of people displaced and becoming refugees, trying to make their way into less contaminated countries. Imagine dozens of major European and Asian cities becoming ghost towns like Pripyat. Imagine the breadbasket of Europe, the most fertile soil rendered unusable for agriculture for generations. Imagine having a daily radiation level feature added to your phone's weather app, and having to shelter in place for weeks at a time until levels are safe enough to venture outside. The consequences go far beyond just the immediate fallout and could change the course of human civilization. I don't think I am exaggerating the situation.

edit: I'm desperately hoping for an expert to tell me I am wrong and there's nothing to worry about.