From the Guardian,
" The Grenfell inquiry will be a stitch-up...
We don’t allow defendants in court cases to select the charges on which they will be tried. So why should the government set the terms of a public inquiry into its own failings? We don’t allow criminal suspects to vet the trial judge. Why should the government approve the inquiry’s chair?
Even before the public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower disaster has begun, it looks like a stitch-up, its initial terms of reference set so narrowly that government policy remains outside the frame. An inquiry that honours the dead would investigate the wider causes of this crime. It would examine a governing ideology that sees torching public protections as a sacred duty.
Let me give you an example. On the morning of 14 June, as the tower blazed, an organisation called the Red Tape Initiative convened for its prearranged discussion about building regulations. One of the organisation’s tasks was to consider whether rules determining the fire resistance of cladding materials should be removed for the sake of construction industry profits."
You may get a better report, than the one by the appointed government agent... but, I really don't know. It's a political hot potato right now and, now, is the best time to establish a frame of reference for the inquiry. In this fashion, the news agencies may be of some value.
Looking at the fuel load of both the Reynobond ACM Polyethylene panels and the Celotex RS5000 Polyisocyanurate foam insulation, the Polyethylene has a possible fuel contribution 3.8 times more than the foam insulation. A 3mm x 1m x 1m sheet of Low Density Polyethylene weighs 2.85kg. 150mm of Celotex RS5000 weighs 4.98kg per square meter. The fuel consumption of Polyethylene can approach 100%, while the residual weight from combustion of Polyisocyanurate is 85%. So for every 2.85kg of Polyethylene available for consumption there was 0.747kg of insulation.
What is interesting is that neither of these materials could have behaved separately as they did together. Removing an external flame source from ignited polyethylene, the flame retracts to just above the surface of the the leading edge of thermal decomposition. Along this edge, there is a pronounced blue component to the flame, denoting efficient fuel consumption & pronounced "convective" heat generation. Of the 3 types of heat that contribute to a fire; Conductive, Convective & Radiant, conductive heating is the worst. The conductive heat released of Red Oak is only a third of its total caloric heat value, whereas Polyethylene releases almost half its total heat in the form of conductive heat. Add back to the Polyethylene the original flame source at Grenfell Tower and confine it to a chimney like space and it creates very suitable conditions for the Celotex to ignite.
What makes the insulation special, is that once its initial resistance to burning is overcome and the Isocyanate component burns, it releases the other main component of the Polyisocyanurate foam, Polyols. The fire generated by polyols is fast and "vigorous" and like the polyethylene produce large amounts of heat. The burning fridge at Grenfell provided the flame source to ignite the polyethylene and the burning polyethylene created the right conditions for the fire resistance of the insulation to be overcome, where by the burning insulation provided the polyol charged flame that kept the polyethylene in near absolute fuel mode. Throw in the air gap and the aluminum for a 'conductive heat' component, pre-heat the polyethylene ACM in advance of the flames and it really was a worst case scenario. Link
from epoxybot's link, "The extra tests will help landlords decide on any remedial action needed to make buildings safer." Shouldn't that read, "The extra tests will help landlords decide on any remedial action needed to make buildings safe." I'm always afraid of how things are written... 'safer' could be supplying each apartment unit with a fire extinguisher.
"Safer" is the word I would use. Nothing is ever truly "safe". (Nothing can ever be safer than the idiots using it, we keep trying to make things idiot-proof but they keep making better idiots, etc.)
Excerpt from the Grenfell Action Group blog,
...reports made by residents that they saw and smelt smoke coming from various electrical appliances on the morning of 29th May. This was the day the whole electrical system went into meltdown, and by the TMO’s own admission, fused several key meters and damaged or destroyed electrical appliances in 40 individual residences.
That sounds like an open neutral. With no neutral reference, the voltage would increase above 230 based on the loading on the various phases. A lightly loaded phase could approach 400V. Nearly everything electrical would fail under those conditions, with a great possibility of them bursting into flames.
Somewhere fairly close (in electrical terms) to the service intake given the number of locations affected. I can easily imagine that inspection of the intake and main distribution gear would be in the 'too difficult, too disruptive' pile of jobs which never get done. It's all too easy to ignore electricity and electrical equipment when it is behaving itself.
While it was the 40 units on the upper floors that sustained loss of appliances and other electrical devices, the power surges & brown-outs affected all the units. I just wonder how many remaining appliances, after the fire can be shown to have degraded capacitors in them from KCTMO's negligence. The particulars of the cladding and probably more so, the column cladding meant this building was a disaster waiting to happen but I think it is important to know if KCTMO "lit the match" by failing to adequately resolve the buildings electrical problems.
I guess there is a down side to using polyiso, from the BBC,
"At least one survivor of the Grenfell Tower fire was diagnosed with cyanide poisoning, BBC Newsnight has learned.
Medical discharge papers show 12-year-old Luana Gomes was treated for the effects of the highly toxic gas, which may have been released by burning of insulation or plastics during the fire.
Her sister and mother were also treated for risk of cyanide poisoning.
Mrs Gomes was seven months pregnant at the time of the blaze. Her unborn baby died after the fire.
It has previously been reported that three Grenfell survivors were treated with a cyanide antidote but this is the first confirmation of a cyanide poisoning diagnosis.
Andreia Gomes and her daughters were placed in medically induced comas when they were admitted to Kings College Hospital."
"Dozens of residents of Grenfell Tower suffered electricity power surges so strong their appliances malfunctioned, overheated and emitted smoke a few years before the fire, it has emerged.
Documents seen by the BBC reveal how 25 residents claimed compensation from the council following the surges in 2013.
Some say electricity problems persisted into the months before June's fire."
I think I'll just add new info to the one message.
From the BBC,
"Burning cladding on Grenfell Tower would have released 14 times more heat than a key government safety test allows, the BBC has learned.
Energy emitted from the cladding and insulation would have been equivalent to burning 51 tonnes of pinewood, University of Leeds research suggests.
The cladding's plastic core would have burned "as quickly as petrol", it said.
The contractors who fitted the cladding and insulation said they both passed all regulations."
An example of how the council of the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (RBKC) undertake matters of fire safety: After prolonged complaints & protest by Estate residents & more specifically the Grenfell Tower & the neighboring finger blocks of Hurstway Walk, Testerton Walk and Barandon Walk, accompanied by fires at two other Estate Towers; the property manager KCTMO, acquiesced to hiring a Fire Inspector to perform an Fire Risk audit. The results were devastating for KCTMO and led to a program of estate property by property inspections via the London Fire Brigade (LFB). A program was established based on High, Intermediate & Low fire risk. What the LFB made plan was that the bulk of the KCTMO properties that were for rent or lease in multiple occupant buildings with interior corridors, was the lacked of 30 minute, self-closing Fire Resistant Entry Doors to secure fire & smoke compartmentalization.
This was a great concern to the RBKC, not because people were at risk but because replacing all the doors was going to be costly and the time frame required by the LFB didn't allow for procrastination & creative budgeting. People within the council & from KCTMO postulated that maybe the door to a Flat was the occupants responsibility, regardless of the fact that they don't actually own the flat. The wording used to justify this advantageous position was that the occupant had "Control" of the door.
When one considers other things the occupant has "Control" over, the toilet & faucets, the windows, doorknobs, SMOKE DETECTORS etc., their reasoning becomes Chuckle-Headed to say the least. But that is the declaration made by the RBKC council and followed up by KCTMO with pressing notifications to the tenants. What will the council & KCTMO do when on the day a tenant moves house and they remove THEIR door, frame & threshold, leaving the flat open to the comings and goings of the curious & needy. This is an excellent example of just how self-serving and intent on having everything go their way, the RBKC & KCTMO really behave.
When you consider that this was all going on parallel to the 4 years of planning & work carried out on the Grenfell Tower Refurbishment; with almost monthly meets or inspections by the LFB and frequent updates to the RBKC council, the idea that Fire Safety & Risk was somehow missed by KCTMO is unfathomable.
Before fire entered the flats at Grenfell Tower, smoke was seeping through the window casements. In this video the "white' smoke isn't captured by the camera within the flat because of the well lit interior side of the window but the double glazed window creates a filtering effect that reveals the smoke penetration, via reflection on the second, outer pane. Link
So why was smoke entering the flats from the window casement surround? I suspect an air gap was left unsealed when the horizontal surface mounted aluminum L brackets were installed against the exposed aggregate spandrel panels. The new windows were reset outward onto the aluminum L brackets, mounted top & bottom, from the older window's original placement on the concrete spandrel by approximately 8 inches. Add in that the concrete spandrel panels would have had a chamfered edge along with the very rough surface texture of an exposed aggregate (large aggregate) and the matter of fire & smoke compartmentalization becomes a problem, not just side to side but top & bottom. The gap between the window angles should have been filled with non sag cementitious compound. Rough numbers, about 600 cubic feet for all four sides.
