Even with a perfectly trained crew, none of this makes me feel any better. Somebody comes to me and says, 5 seconds to make life or death decisions. I say, Get out of my office.
--Einstein gave the same test to students every year. When asked why he would do something like that, "Because the answers had changed."
It's not 5 seconds to life or death. There are five seconds to reach for a switch that is already in place before anything else can happen, and even 7-8 seconds isn't enough to be a threat. What is a threat is to let multiple failures to act build up. Or treating the study material as if it is for a final one will never take.
If you are nervous about that time, consider what happens on a crowded road if you close your eyes for 5 seconds while driving. For the USA types, on the highway, that is more than the length of a football field (the ovoid version, not the black and white sphere) that will be covered.
Maybe if the pilots had experienced a simulated MCAS attack in a sim, they would have been better prepared.
Wait, they couldn't do that.
Boeing misled the FAA so as to intentionally and specifically avoid sim training.
Yes, the pilots made mistakes.
That is a not unexpected outcome of inadequate training.
How much responsibility falls on the pilots and how much on Boeing?
After the first crash, Boeing issued an AD.
After the second crash, the type was grounded for 20 months.
I suggest that the pilot's responsibility compared to Boeing's responsibility is in the ratio of an AD, versus a 20 month grounding of a fleet.
Pilots; BAD.
Boeing; BADDER.
-------------------- Ohm's law
Not just a good idea; It's the LAW!
Well thankfully it's all history now they have changed the system so it can't happen again. Not relying on pilot perfection.
And the uncertified variants are getting looked at properly. Hence them not getting certified any time soon. Some think it may never get certified.
And the type is now dead thankfully.
Btw there is a hard core of experienced 737 pilots in Europe who also have the same view it's purely crew and the grounding should never have happened. 3 of which I know personally failed the A220 type rating in the LHS and have left to fly in Africa.
Next big question is how badly this lack of aircraft is going to effect the US airlines.
Airbus doesn't seem to be that interested in increasing the production in the USA.
That particular source can't, but the remaining causes laid out by the NTSB stand loud and clear.
So, experienced 737 pilots have trouble changing to an entirely different platform? Shocked.
Not mentioning what the trouble was is just the icing on that particular cake. Was it the transition from a platform that allowed control with either hand in either seat to one in which the less dominant hand might be the only one to use, sometimes?
How does the other direction go?
"Airbus To Correct A220 Autothrottle Imperfection
Thierry Dubois September 08, 2023
LYON—Airbus is working on improving the A220’s autothrottle design, after several reports of crew errors that could have led to a tail strike or more serious incidents.
The aircraft’s autopilot will be modified, too. In the meantime, procedures are temporarily added in the takeoff phase."
Huh. I thought Airbus didn't skimp. Guess that was wrong. And Airbus doesn't depend on pilots recalling procedures. Also wrong. What is the world coming to?
Nearly put it into the ground from pilots mishandling the plane following a failure of the A220 much-vaunted automation.
Such a situation can be avoided by design, the airframer’s engineers have determined. To prevent autopilot engagement during the takeoff roll, the Primary Flight Control Computer will be upgraded to inhibit autopilot engagement until six seconds after liftoff. The improvement will be introduced in the second quarter of 2024.
As for the autothrottle, its disconnect logic is being updated. The issues that caused it to disconnect during the takeoff roll will be addressed, Airbus says, falling short of giving a time frame.
Currently if it comes out before 60knts you abandon the takeoff. Once thrust hold is active at about 70 knts you continue. And it's a mandatory item every SIM check. You engage it above 400 again with the AP in.
The fix will make it impossible for the AP to be engage below 400ft rad alt.
I will admit the thrust system is quite sensitive to rates of movement of the levers. To fast or a shove against the servo once it's grabbed it and it thinks it's a system fault.
In the air if you grab them and haul back to reduce thrust which doesn't actually speed up the power coming off it thinks it's control fault and you get a double automatic engine shut down as soon as you touch down. Again it's linked to previous aircraft type methods.
Personally I gently push forward at less than the speed the servo increases at, It then takes it away from your hand and zero issues.
It's mainly an issue with previous other type pilots that getting it to grab was more agricultural in engagement. See the 777 crash in Dubai. If you don't ram it forward it just ends up sitting there at about 80% N1.
The trim switch was installed upside down so when the pilot in command went to pitch forward, it pitched back. He kept trimming and the plane got worse. The plane had been checked multiple times for pitch trim problems, eventually traced to a safety wire pigtail impinging on the harness causing a short circuit.
Should there be a "safety wire short circuit with trim switch installed upside down training" or would it rather be the pilot exercise some CRM and ask, as he eventually did, for the co-pilot to try his side?
On top of which, before the flight "The switch was reinstalled and placarded as inoperative."
Surely EICAS would save the day? Not if pilots don't bother reading it:
Safety investigators discovered that the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) provided a “PITCH TRIM SW1 FAIL” advisory message on the morning of this incident.
Did Embraer ground all the aircraft to redesign the switch so it could not be installed upside down? That doesn't appear to be the case. The airline did inspect and found 9 other planes with similar impingement and cutting of insulation. Was there a worldwide stop to examine all switches to ensure they could not be installed in the reverse direction? Was there a grounding to check all Embraer aircraft wiring to ensure this and every other location were not being cut by the same carelessly applied safety wire? Nope.
I bet we could blame the CEO of Embraer if this had killed "important" people for not being focused on safety. After all, what pilot hasn't ignored EICAS and a placard? There is even a separate cutout for each pilot's trim switch that could have been set to cutout at the gate to fully inop the switch.
What is peculiar is MCAS is mentioned in part 3 without mentioning that CUTOUT has been there for just such reasons for decades. Yeah, the first line on NG and Classic is to pull back. The second line didn't cease to exist; if pull back failed, use cutout.
"I have posted about the A220 AT issue" Must have missed the thread for that.
Have you talked about the rotten to the core software development or the profit depraved management of Airbus?
It cannot be pilot error that causes it. It's only failed design.
Congrats on flying A220s after all the time in the Dash 8. What else are you qualified for?
EASA (JAR at the time) deemed your type ratings dead after 3 years. And if you wanted to fly them again it was a new type rating.
Single engine piston was an abridged ppl course.
The accident stats showed pilots jumping back into a type, carried a collosal risk.
Don't have a clue what the rest of the world has done on the subject.
I wouldn't like to fly the Jetstream again without doing it's system theory or sim again. And I flew that for 15 years.
I didn't do that much in the Q400 2500 hours which I will have more than on the A220 end of next month flying it since COVID started.
Big difference is number of approaches. Jetstream average flight length was 45mins, Q400 1 hour. A220 it's 2:50 min.
Your modern straight to jet pilot has a fraction of the takeoffs and landings that an ex turboprop pilot has.
I have 11.5k hours total.
In that time I have seen communication and human factors be the cause of over 99% of issues and incidents where I have worked. If you leave a hole open for pilots to screw it up they will do it.
No don't know much to be honest about real Airbuses. But know the none moving power leavers needed fixed in the 90's.
The pilots that have flown them say the A220 and the biz jets that use the same system stand far ahead of it and it's logic.
But it will be the same stagnation issue Boeing has no bonuses for that sort of progress.
Honeywell are playing a similar game with the A220 there is a firewall penalty point. There have been issues since the A220 release date which haven't been fixed. We expect them only to be actually be fixed when it starts costing them money
I used to work for this company and know the captain. He was a trainer and examiner. And also previously he was a test pilot for BAe for the aircraft type.
I always deice if there is a hint of frost on the flight surfaces and have the cowl anti ice on below 5 degs on the A220.
The clean aircraft of ice has been known about since WW2
It's mandatory winter ops training every year... That pilot even instructed my first winter ops course as a new FO on my first type...
I suspect it was the use of type 4 previously with no cleaning afterwards. But a squirt with type 1 as was indicated by wx would have warmed it up.
You must be the most nervous passenger alive given that all aircraft are badly designed, pilots don't know how to fly planes with faults or deal with incidents and no one is listening to you....
The Max should never have been certified as essentially the same aircraft as the NG needing only the famous one hour I pad training (would other tablets work)? It never was and isn't now. Short cut established training and safety systems and crashes will happen.
Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.
"Boeing" isn't suffering, no matter how gleeful anyone gets. The people who made the decisions are long since retired. They aren't suffering. The only people who are suffering either had nothing to do with it or have no influence over it.
The nonsense with the A220 which spectacularly back fired was less than 10 years ago.
The ones from the 90's will mostly be gone
I suspect alot of people don't actually realise the repercussions from the max. If it does take another 5 years plus to get the 10 through don't be suprised
