Alaska Airlines flight forced to make an emergency landing (Part II)... 26

[Murph 9000]

… There are discussions about pilot lockouts on some features. And also the use of AI

I'm sorry, Dave. I'm afraid I can't do that.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

Yes, but its already here to be honest.

In the old days we used to have switches we could turn off the engine temperature and torque limitations and decide to make it the last use of them.

Only used it once on the jetstream. Turned out that you can run garretts at 108% torque with no effect...

These days the FADEC is in control of all that with no override. I am not bothered by that though.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

this is the reason for the pilot testing

Consistent with this philosophy, the NTSB notes that FAA certification guidance in
AC 25.1309-1A that allows manufacturers to assume pilots will respond to failure conditions
appropriately is based, in part, upon the applicant showing that the systems, controls, and
associated monitoring and warnings are designed to minimize crew errors, which could create
additional hazards.16 While Boeing considered the possibility of uncommanded MCAS operation
as part of its functional hazard assessment, it did not evaluate all the potential alerts and indications
that could accompany a failure that also resulted in uncommanded MCAS operation. Therefore,
neither Boeing’s system safety assessment nor its simulator tests evaluated how the combined
effect of alerts and indications might impact pilots’ recognition of which procedure(s) to prioritize
in responding to an unintended MCAS operation caused by an erroneous AOA input.17 The NTSB
is concerned that, if manufacturers assume correct pilot response without comprehensively
examining all possible flight deck alerts and indications that may occur for system and component
failures that contribute to a given hazard, the hazard classification and resulting system design
(including alerts and indications), procedural, and/or training mitigations may not adequately
consider and account for the potential for pilots to take actions that are inconsistent with
manufacturer assumptions.

Thus, the NTSB concludes that the assumptions that Boeing used in its functional hazard
assessment of uncommanded MCAS function for the 737 MAX did not adequately consider and
account for the impact that multiple flight deck alerts and indications could have on pilots’
responses to the hazard. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require that Boeing
(1) ensure that system safety assessments for the 737 MAX in which it assumed immediate and
appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded flight control inputs, from
systems such as MCAS, consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on
pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck
alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where needed, to minimize
the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with manufacturer
assumptions.

Further, because FAA guidance allows such assumptions to be made in transport-category
airplane certification analyses without providing applicants with clear direction concerning the
consideration of multiple flight deck alerts and indications in evaluating pilot recognition and
response, the NTSB is concerned that similar assumptions and procedures for their validation may
have also been used in the development of flight control system safety assessments for other
airplanes. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require that for all other
US type-certificated transport-category airplanes, manufacturers (1) ensure that system safety
assessments for which they assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in
response to uncommanded flight control inputs consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts
and indications on pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements
(including flight deck alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where
needed, to minimize the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with
manufacturer assumptions.

Seems there is a load of stuff on Pprune as well basically saying any talk of it not being completely pilot error for the second one is just a political attack on the USA trying to destroy Boeing,

 

[LittleInch]

https://www.theguardian.com/business/article/2024/may/02/second-boeing-whistleblower-dies

At this rate people will start falling down stairs or out of windows in high rise buildings....

Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

Just reading an industry essay which is looking at the quality issues in spirit.

It was pointed out that airbus has quite alot of production at spirit but yet doesn't seem to be having QA issues with what's delivered.

 

[dik]

It might depend on what their QA/QC agreement with Spirit may have been...

-----*****-----
So strange to see the singularity approaching while the entire planet is rapidly turning into a hellscape. -John Coates

-Dik

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

There is major talk about the production in Northern Ireland and a few others places which isn't involved with Boeing.

The majority view is that Boeing would play silly games if they had control of it.

 

[SWComposites]

Part of the quality difference may be that Airbus hasn’t pushed their suppliers for cost reductions as hard as Boeing did with their “Partnering for Success” program meaning lets screw them over on price while we babble on about “partnerships” BS.

 

[3DDave]

That Spirit accepted the conditions is a problem. Can't push what won't move.

For a while my wife was in procurement and got pressure to get a supplier to reduce prices in view of a competitor. The supplier said thanks, but no, and to feel free to go with the competitor. So they did. In a year of getting garbage products and garbage performance and garbage product support, they came back to the original supplier who kept the same price he had before, same service he had before. He said he hadn't been worried in the slightest as he knew the trouble the other company was to deal with and now the org my wife procured for did too - and that was worth it.

I figure there were bonuses on the Spirit books for meeting cost goals whether Boeing was involved or not.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

The Belfast plant the discussions are centring around virtually nil investment since it was bought from Bombardier.

And Airbus wanting money to take it onboard. Which I presume will mean eventually they will be given it. There is a load of pension debts as well and also huge shutting down costs if it goes that far 4000 employees plus site sterilisation back to nature.

You might wonder why I have an interest in that plant. I know 3 people that work there but not closely. Don't have any inside gossip.

 

[SWComposites]

Alistair - isn't that the old Shorts Brothers plant? And didn't it get sold to Spirit when Bombardier had to be rescued by Airbus?

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

yes it is, I believe. Although the timing of the sale I have no clue about.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

https://www.theguardian.com/busines...s-belfast-factory-sold-to-spirit-in-850m-deal

Found this. Didn't realise it was a recent purchase by spirit.

Maybe why the QA issues haven't formed yet. Although it will be an EASA regulated site

Think the C series was sold in 2017-2018.

The site though has collosal historical issues if it ever gets change of use. Wouldn't be surprised if there is a load of WW2 munitions buried under it.

 

[JohnRBaker]

This may not end well...

Boeing may be prosecuted after breaking safety agreement that prevented criminal charges for 737 crashes, US DOJ says

https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/14/business/boeing-justice-department-criminal-prosecution/index.html

An excerpt from the above item:

The US Justice Department on Tuesday notified Boeing that it breached terms of its 2021 agreement in which the company avoided criminal charges for two fatal 737 Max crashes.

After a series of safety missteps earlier this year, including a door plug that blew off an Alaska Airlines flight shortly after takeoff in January, the Department of Justice said Boeing is now subject to criminal prosecution.

“For failing to fulfill completely the terms of and obligations under the [deferred prosecution agreement], Boeing is subject to prosecution by the United States for any federal criminal violation of which the United States has knowledge,” the Justice Department said in a letter to US District Judge Reed O’Connor in Fort Worth, Texas, who oversaw the prior agreement.

John R. Baker, P.E. (ret)
Irvine, CA
Siemens PLM:

The secret of life is not finding someone to live with
It's finding someone you can't live without

 

[TugboatEng]

Sounds like a bunch of hot air. If you want to make a difference you must prosecute the individuals involved.

 

[waross]

I was just following orders.
The workers followed the line managers' orders.
The line managers followed the senior managers' orders.
Senior management was directed by the CEO.
The CEO followed direction from the board of directors.
The board of directors followed the owners wishes; profit at any cost.
So if the ultimate responsibility falls back on the owners, how do you punish the owners?
Charge and fine the company and hit the owners in the pocket book.
Noting that many of the owners may be large groups such as pension funds and mutual funds, it will be an incentive to the individuals and groups to be more careful in their choices and expectations of fund managers.


--------------------
Ohm's law
Not just a good idea;
It's the LAW!

 

[TugboatEng]

It's interesting in the Dali grounding, many complain about the prehistoric rules used by the maritime industry such as general average. However, it's rare for an individual to put cargo on a ship. It's usually large logistics companies that make the arrangements. With general average and shared responsibility it puts some burden on the logistics organizations to verify the quality of the shippers they are utilizing. The logistics companies that have to share the cost of a loss under general average are a lot like pension and mutual funds that have to share the losses from bad corporate policy.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

You won't make a difference going for the technical individuals.

You need to be able to go for the bonuses and individuals that set the policy who are almost impossible to prosecute. They have things set up so anything gets pushed to the relatively low paid technical staff.

 

[TugboatEng]

I've said in the past that I say things to be controversial but when you go after bonuses of the shareholders you're not really doing any damage. The shareholders can live without one or two bonuses. If you go after the people physically doing the shoddy work, that will be a career ender for them. It will make a strong deterrence against others performing the same shotty work for their benevolent leaders.

This works quite well in smaller industries. Our operators' careers are on the line if there is a failure that causes an accident (See MV Dali). It's not that they'll be fired, they lose their government issued license to operate so they can't even go elsewhere. If they feel there is an issue they will sure as hell tell us they're not operating that vessel until the problem is resolved.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

Most of these QA issues they are having are not being performed by licensed individuals.

The old Jetstream built in Prestwick Scotland was basically wired by all the local TV repairers when production started.

The licensed side of things becomes more defined and aggressive when the aircraft is handed over and starts operating. Before that the OEM QA system is meant to track it all.

Its not the shareholder bonuses they should be going after its the management and financial controller bonuses.