New Netflix show 3

Challenger: The Final Flight
Should be required viewing for engineers and those who manage them.

 

[1503-44]

Thank you.

We need an engineering movie review forum.
There is far too much rubbish on the tubes these days.

 

[JohnRBaker]

Not sure if this was ever on Netflix, but a really interesting film, particularly for anyone who was ever a machine designer (like me), is this one, 'Linotype: The film'.

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2130114/

I downloaded my copy from 'Apple iTunes' (now 'Apple tv').

John R. Baker, P.E. (ret)
EX-Product 'Evangelist'
Irvine, CA
Siemens PLM:
UG/NX Museum:

The secret of life is not finding someone to live with
It's finding someone you can't live without

 

[thebard3]

I watched the series. It is well written and interesting. About 3-1/2 episodes are dedicated to the human interest aspect related to the crew(as it should). They actually interviewed Larry Mulloy who was instrumental in promoting the flawed decision to launch. I would have liked more in-depth detail about the technical aspects of the failure but in fact, I find much relevant information in the Columbia accident report.
Link here: Link
It was a different technical issue but was also very similar when considering the many failings that contributed to the loss of Challenger. Many hours, days, or weeks of reading if it interests you as much as I.

Brad Waybright

The more you know, the more you know you don't know.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

you might like

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Truth-Lies-Rings-Challenger-Disaster/dp/0813041937

As a none American it is also quiet interesting giving the back ground process about some of these political hearings and the general mind set of some of the people involved.

I had to go searching for the redesign features after reading it though. And it really doesn't cover the amount of changes that the joint had done to it.

As a matter of note the proposed next moon rockets use the same solid boosters extended with an extra section. So the design lives on.

 

[thebard3]

I don't really know what could be in that book that isn't already known. There is plenty of dissenting testimony from other Thiokol engineers in the CAIB report related to the launch decision. Also, lots of discussion about the known o-ring troubles that were never adequately addressed, or ignored even, by NASA and Thiokol.

I might still check it out, though. It is right up my alley.

Brad Waybright

The more you know, the more you know you don't know.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

its very one sided as you might imagine.

It also covers the debris shedding which took out Columbia it was also an issue from before challenger. But it was this same thing with various contractors pointing fingers at other contractors where it was coming from.

It doesn't go into technical detail enough for my liking but enough to hold my interest to the end.

My main though was he survived to them launching it again. From my googling he was one of the few that actually was allowed to continue to work on it.

And the astronaut core seemed to value his opinion. Which is ever a group of people that have zero issues calling a spade a spade its them. He did go on a bit blowing sunshine up his own arse but I put that down to cultural differences between a septic and a Scotsman. He is way way more of an engineer than I am so I have every respect for him.

 

[JohnRBaker]

Speaking of which, here's a shot of a section of the shuttle booster casing, taken at a so-called 'Rocket Park' outside the main laboratory building, near Promontory, UT, for ATK (the 'T' stands for Thiokol), the company that manufactured the shuttle boosters. My old school and Army buddy, Dennis (former CIA Deputy Director), and I stopped there on one of our photo safaris and of course we had to get pictures of these items:

October 2009 (Sony A100)

And being a couple of engineers, we couldn't miss taking a close-up of the 'problem' area:

October 2009 (Sony A100)

John R. Baker, P.E. (ret)
EX-Product 'Evangelist'
Irvine, CA
Siemens PLM:
UG/NX Museum:

The secret of life is not finding someone to live with
It's finding someone you can't live without

 

[thebard3]

Interesting that they would put something so infamous on display. It would be a little like Boeing having a 737 MCAS exhibit.

Brad Waybright

The more you know, the more you know you don't know.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

This is about the only place you could get away with posting a pic like this.. I consider it engineering porn.

The book covers some of the testing considerations and also the environmental lengths they went to to make sure it didn't happen again.

 

[EdStainless]

I was buying o-rings from Seals-Eastern, and Dan was one of the best engineers that I ever met.
He was one of the elastomer specialists on the Columbia failure work.
He and I discussed this this in detail.
Truly a case of multiple small failure adding up to a disaster.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
P.E. Metallurgy, consulting work welcomed

 

[JohnRBaker]

It's quite possible that that segment of the shuttle booster had been on display since before the Challenger accident. There was certainly no mention of it on the information placard:

October 2009 (Sony A100)

Note that this so-called 'Rocket Park' was just an open-air display set-up in front of the the ATK laboratory (but outside the gate so that anyone could visit, we were there on a Sunday morning).

October 2009 (Sony A100)

It contained mostly one-of-kind and first-of-a-kind rocket engines as well as examples of some of their more recognized items like the Minuteman I ICBM and the Shuttle Booster:

October 2009 (Sony A100)


John R. Baker, P.E. (ret)
EX-Product 'Evangelist'
Irvine, CA
Siemens PLM:
UG/NX Museum:

The secret of life is not finding someone to live with
It's finding someone you can't live without

 

[Agent666]

I've read the book linked by Alastair a few years ago. I found it interesting as someone with a passing interest in space in general.

While it is a one sided view of the entire process/failings, it is written from the perspective of someone on the right side of history so to speak.

 

[btrueblood]

I worked on the Shuttle program (for the Rocketdyne main engines) for awhile as a fresh newly-graduated aerospace engineer, during the post-Challenger disaster recovery phase. It was quite disheartening - we were on a mandatory 54-hr/week schedule, and tasked with proposing fixes for known problems on the main engines...only to see ECR after ECR disallowed by the "customer" because the fixes were not "flight proven". There is a very strong conservative, "if it ain't broke don't fix it" attitude in aero/astro that can drive an R+D person crazy. Yeah, it hasn't broken yet, but the signs of damage are there, so let us fix it before the next flight...nope. I got a transfer to the R+D side and forgot about the Shuttle. Until Columbia. Did you know there was a kit for on-orbit repairs of the heat shield tiles that was developed in the early shuttle program? Did you know the kit never flew because they didn't want to waste the payload, and there were concerns it might not work (if you don't test it you can't say either way can you)? Not to say the kit would have made a serviceable repair for the leading edge c-c fairings, but if it's not even on board it becomes a moot point. 7 people dead because they hadn't had a critical heat shield failure...yet.

 

[Alistair_Heaton]

BT you have my utter respect for having to work through that period as a pilot and a ex engineer. As a pilot I hope people like you are looking after the hardware big picture.

 

[CWB1]

Thanks for suggesting the series. I dont watch much television so dont usually hear of these shows. I watched the series over the last two evenings, good stuff but definitely too light on the investigation which takes up most of MacDonald's book. To be fair, the investigation did devolve into quite a bit of he said/she said, doubletalk, and Clinton'esque nitpicking of language among other absurdity that a layperson might fall for. The interviews with Mulloy and Lucas were interesting and telling, especially the comments that neither had any regrets or guilt over their decision to fly that day.

 

[RVAmeche]

Having just watched it, I feel like its very telling that Larry Mulloy and Will Lucas (the managers) were the only people who said they'd still make the same decisions because the "data was inconclusive". Considering the launch spec was 40-50F and they were constantly accepting waivers to maintain schedule, I don't understand their position. They clearly strong armed Thiokol into keeping schedule. The correct engineering decision would be to delay if there's any question since peoples lives are on the line and there's already a history of partial failures.

Additionally, Lucas basically said "to make an omelet you have to crack eggs". I get the gist of the sentiment, that people will invariably die as we push the borders of technology. But the Challenger launch wasn't a new event and the launches had a history of partial failures due to the design flaw but they moved ahead because of schedule/optics. Those people didn't die due to bleeding edge tech or unforeseen events. They died because the managers cared more about their careers and making their schedules instead of listening to the SMEs. It's disgusting.

 

[Andries]

As I remember reading, Stalin also used the expression "to make an omelet you have to crack eggs" to justify his mass executions, which makes Lucas' comment even more callous.

Andries

 

[thebard3]

They died because the managers cared more about their careers and making their schedules instead of listening to the SMEs. It's disgusting.

Copy and paste that comment into a discussion of the space shuttle Columbia accident too.

Brad Waybright

The more you know, the more you know you don't know.

 

[Sparweb]

Mulloy and Lucas were not going to go on television and ruin their lives by admitting that they caused the death of the Challenger crew. At least Mulloy had the decency to show us that he feels bad about what ultimately happened. Lucas was just... cold.

http://www.sparweb.ca