from the BBC, "Seven residential high-rise buildings in four local authority areas have been found to be covered in combustible cladding following safety tests.
Landlords are being told and more checks carried out, number 10 said.
It comes as further tests are being carried out on about 600 high rises across England.
Cladding is thought to have contributed to the rapid spread of fire at Grenfell Tower, in which at least 79 people are believed to have died.
Extra checks by the fire service would determine whether the buildings were safe and what - if any - action needed to be taken, the prime minister's spokesman said.
He pointed out that a failed cladding test did not necessarily mean a building was unsafe - that would depend on the amount of cladding used and where it was fitted.
Arconic, an engineering and manufacturing company, said one of its products, Reynobond PE (polyethylene) - an aluminium composite material - was "used as one component in the overall cladding system" of Grenfell Tower."
It's my understanding that the issue with cladding material in multistory or high rise buildings isn't just with the cladding material but the entire assembly as a whole - including installation details. Each installation and any additional "layer" to a wall needs to be tested separately because fire can react to each assembly differently.
PIR foam is a thermoset material which means - while combustible, they form a char and doesn't contribute to the spread of flame. That being said, any foam plastic still needs to be separated by a thermal barrier or be tested as a thermal barrier. The ACM material however, is a thermoplastic which can melt and ignite at lower temperatures.
I'm not too familiar with the European codes, but typically foam plastic insulation and metal/aluminum composite materials need to be tested via FM 4880 and NFPA 285. These are tests that measure the flame characteristics of the foam as well as the cladding assembly in multistory buildings. The Grenfell tower installation looked different than what Reynobond has in their ICC-ES report. Building codes would have different requirements for materials rated with different types of flammability characteristics which are intended to prevent disasters like this.
there's a 'fire test' that shows what happens to PIR foam when there is no thermal reflector and there is no preheated air. Given that the PIR surface is immediately combustible and was installed on the tower under an aluminum panel that reflected the heat of combustion back onto the foam and prevented the heated air from escaping as it does in the short video, it makes me wonder what happens when it exceeds 200C, listed as the breakdown temp for the isocyanurate bonds. Does evolve any combustible gases above that temp?
Part of the problem is not knowing what the UK codes are and what is acceptable. If they permit combustible insulation, in any area, except for a few specialised applications and absolutely nothing in high rise cladding, they they are negligent. xez: I think your understanding is correct.
About half way down the web page is a graphic showing the suspected point of the fires origin. The fire started on the East side of the building, which has 3 spandrel panels & two inside columns, as does the West side. The North & South have 4 spandrel panels & 3 inside columns. Assuming the kitchen/refrigerator fire was the source, then the fire would have started at the East-Northeast inside column. All the kitchens in the building are oriented East to West & radiating from the building core. Here you can see the window arrangement with exhaust fan at the E-NE inner column on the Eastern face of the structure, starting at the 4th or 5th floor. Did an open window supply the flame & the fan enrich the burning? Reports suggest the Fire Dept had just put out the kitchen fire and were returning to the Fire Coach with the facade burst into flames. The Fire crew should know if the exhaust fan in service & window was open. The frame of the window is quite close to the column panel/facade joint/gap.
Great link... noted in the comments for the link, a safety group had been established, and, one of the comments, "Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in our landlords failure to deal with a serious health and safety issue that recently developed at the entrance/exit to Grenfell Tower. This matter is of particular concern as there is only one entry and exit to Grenfell Tower during the Improvement Works and the potential for a fire to break out in the communal area on the walkway does not bear thinking about as residents would be trapped in the building with no way out!"
If the tenants were really concerned they could have hauled the rubbish out... The tenants were not at all aware of the real safety issues... ones that would take 80 lives.
My calcs tell me that, with the 150mm of PIR insulation, 50mm air gap and a composite aluminum skin with 4mm core LDPE layer cuts down heat loss to 15% of the bare wall heat loss, which clearly justifies thermal insulation. The biggest resistance to heat transfer is the insulation.
Replacement of the PIR insulation with the same thickness of rock wool insulation cuts down heat loss to 18% of that for the bare wall, so about the same thermal performance as PIR insulation.
From the CBC, "A fire that engulfed a London apartment block, killing at least 79 people earlier this month, started in a fridge freezer, police in the U.K. city said Friday.
Det. Supt. Fiona McCormack said the Hotpoint model, FF175BP, was not subject to recall and that the manufacturer was doing further tests.
"We now have expert evidence that the fire was not started deliberately," McCormack said.
Whirlpool, the company that owns Hotpoint, said it is helping authorities get all the information needed for the investigation.
Police said both the insulation and tiles used in cladding at the 24-storey Grenfell Tower block failed all post-fire safety tests.
"Preliminary tests show the insulation samples collected from Grenfell Tower combusted soon after the test started," McCormack said."
Thanks 3D... didn't know they used that for a coolant until this fire broke out... I've moved the kitchen fire extinguisher to the other side of the stove rather than between the fridge and the stove... maybe makes more sense.
If this had occurred in North America, you would be looking at the largest professional liability claim ever as well as damages to those injured. A matter of filing a complaint against the architects with whatever registering body they have. Contacting the architects for a manner of repair, and then launching a lawsuit.
dik, this is where things get muddy. Do we know for sure that flammable insulation was specified? Or maybe it was substituted as an or equal? Does the code address this? Juries tend to put great stock in "we followed the code, bad as it was..."
How much of the liability goes to the refrigerator manufacturer? How much to the original architect? How much to the insulation manufacturer?
I wouldn't want to be in any of their shoes right now. Of course, all their suffering doesn't amount to anything compared to the people who died, lost loved ones or were injured.
No idea... but, it was unlikely that the change to the cladding was done without approval by the architect. Fridge manufacturer was American...
Lots of targets, but if construction was anything like North America, the Architect was in the loop and either spec'd the original material, or, approved the alternative. Being a knowledgeable professional, he may be largely to blame.
If the fridge manufacturer had prior information about the incendiary nature of his fridges, he is another good target. I'm surprised there has been little discussion about the pending litigation. I would have thought the lawyers would be 'lining the streets'. They now have 27 buildings that are 'fire traps'.
The Grenfell Towers project was tendered as design/build with the Council & TMO(prop. mgmt.) novating(transferring) the Architect's contract to the winning bidder. A new player in all of this is Artelia. Artelia was in some way involved as project manager but it may be that they were simply involved in EU scheduled contract compliance of public tenders. Here is the public tender.
The contract was awarded on Jun 2, 2014. The 1st joint newsletter (June) from KCTMO & Rydon states "Since the April
newsletter we have been busy working with the Council’s planning department on the type of cladding which will be used." By August a full size mock up of the cladding was on display on the 2nd floor exterior.
I'm not convinced that there is any manufacture's defect that can be assigned to the Hotpoint refrigerator. The model ceased production in 2009 after a production run of over 60K. The most frequent complaint was that it was noisy. The majority of other performance complaints are the kind most service technicians are familiar with and in spite of what many purchasers may insist is not true remain valid. Examples: The refrigerator is not on a dedicated circuit or the refrigerator is not on a circuit of correct amperage, etc. I think it more likely that the buildings electrical wiring and power management damaged either the resident's wiring or the fridge. The Grenfell Action Group has a blog entry from 2013 regarding power surges and brown outs, that in a large multi-story residential building are disturbing. This building was built in the 70's & while there is not confirmation, consider that there are other Social Estates in the UK, built at that time, that were wired with aluminum wiring, common in the 70's. From what I have gathered, insufficient power will eventually cause your electronics & appliances stop working but power surges are what cause them to burst into flames. The Grenfell Action Group described these problems as occurring at night. Here is the blog entry.
