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24-level building tower fire in West London 33
- Thread starter Ingenuity
- Start date
dik,
One factor may be the unusually warm wweather we've had in the UK recently, and the general lack of A/C in residential properties in this country: there is every chance that the residents simply had their windows open for ventilation, and once the fire was established it would be difficult to get to the windows in order to close them.
One factor may be the unusually warm wweather we've had in the UK recently, and the general lack of A/C in residential properties in this country: there is every chance that the residents simply had their windows open for ventilation, and once the fire was established it would be difficult to get to the windows in order to close them.
georgeverghese,
I know little about insulation, but did raise the issue of the insulation in a post above. If what you say about the Celotex layer is correct, then that was a bigger contributor than the Reynobond composite. Would like to hear some further comment about that from the chemical and mechanical folks who should know.
One correction to your list: the spandrel panels below the windows are precast concrete, about 200 thick I think, not masonry brick.
I know little about insulation, but did raise the issue of the insulation in a post above. If what you say about the Celotex layer is correct, then that was a bigger contributor than the Reynobond composite. Would like to hear some further comment about that from the chemical and mechanical folks who should know.
One correction to your list: the spandrel panels below the windows are precast concrete, about 200 thick I think, not masonry brick.
Georgeverghese,
Celotax and its rival brand Kingspan are used in many domestic and commercial new-builds in the UK. Am I correct to think that these materials present a relatively low hazard due to fire when they are sandwiched between two masonry walls?
Celotax and its rival brand Kingspan are used in many domestic and commercial new-builds in the UK. Am I correct to think that these materials present a relatively low hazard due to fire when they are sandwiched between two masonry walls?
@georgeverghese,
I think it's probably a bit early to say "... the major contributor, without a doubt, is this ..." as there is still a lot of uncertainty and speculation about exactly what products (both cladding and insulation) were:
a) specified; and
b) approved / certified; and
c) purchased / installed; and
d) inspected / certified as being compliant with the design, manufacturer's certified details, etc?
It is obvious that the installed facade performed catastrophically. However, it is quite possible that the original design / specification was entirely code-compliant, but if there was a substitution of products (e.g. substitution of flammable cladding and / or insulation where non-flammable materials should have been specified), and / or if installation details were altered from the approved details, this could have had catastrophic consequences.
It is even possible (although I would think unlikely), that the entire design and installation was code-compliant, and the major issue might be that the UK codes are hugely deficient.
I suspect the inquiry will reveal issues at all stages of the specification, design, procurement, installation and inspection / certification chain - especially when they start looking at a large number of over-clad high-rise buildings.
I think it's probably a bit early to say "... the major contributor, without a doubt, is this ..." as there is still a lot of uncertainty and speculation about exactly what products (both cladding and insulation) were:
a) specified; and
b) approved / certified; and
c) purchased / installed; and
d) inspected / certified as being compliant with the design, manufacturer's certified details, etc?
It is obvious that the installed facade performed catastrophically. However, it is quite possible that the original design / specification was entirely code-compliant, but if there was a substitution of products (e.g. substitution of flammable cladding and / or insulation where non-flammable materials should have been specified), and / or if installation details were altered from the approved details, this could have had catastrophic consequences.
It is even possible (although I would think unlikely), that the entire design and installation was code-compliant, and the major issue might be that the UK codes are hugely deficient.
I suspect the inquiry will reveal issues at all stages of the specification, design, procurement, installation and inspection / certification chain - especially when they start looking at a large number of over-clad high-rise buildings.
- Thread starter
- #85
Summary of what a perimeter section 'make-up' looks like (excluding the upper and lower details of how the cladding integrates into the window framing):
From the Celotex website, the datasheet on the RS5000 product Link (which is specifically designed for 'rainscreen' cladding applications), states:
"100mm SFS" is cold-formed steel framing.
The fire performance system testing appears to be done on a 12mm fiber cement panel cladding system.
No mention of the ACM panels in any fire performance system testing.
From the Celotex website, the datasheet on the RS5000 product Link (which is specifically designed for 'rainscreen' cladding applications), states:
"100mm SFS" is cold-formed steel framing.
The fire performance system testing appears to be done on a 12mm fiber cement panel cladding system.
No mention of the ACM panels in any fire performance system testing.
georgeverghese
Chemical
Agree, news indicates the masonry brick here is 250mm thick, and the air gap is 50mm - these will make the case for justifying the insulation even more difficult. Am not a fire expert by any means, but personally, I would baulk at the thought of using this awful isocyanurate foam material as insulation for any application, even if it were to be sandwiched in between 2 brick layers (unless you tell me the insulation cavity is completely airtight for 50years, even in fire conditions ) - the thick black billowing smoke we see in the video clips and photos tells me this could have only been from some cheap insulation. Should have been mineral wool or rock wool if you really need safe thermal insulation.
Believe this building had a gas supply to all floors - did the mains autoshutoff valve close off early on in the fire? I hear in the videoclips of blue flames shooting out of some windows long after the fire escalated - this could only be natural gas. And that there were no flammable gas detection devices installed in this bldg??
Believe this building had a gas supply to all floors - did the mains autoshutoff valve close off early on in the fire? I hear in the videoclips of blue flames shooting out of some windows long after the fire escalated - this could only be natural gas. And that there were no flammable gas detection devices installed in this bldg??
LittleInch
Petroleum
It will hopefully come out in the enquiry, but I believe there are significant questions about not only the cladding, but also how the windows were fixed in.
Building regs have this issue about "cold spots" so there could easily be some sort of insulation around the window frames which melted in the heat allowing flames in. I've seen window frames "fixed" to the window holes by using expanding foam only in my time so how to prevent the window frames from failing needs to be considered.
Other point is that unlike the drawing, the reality if you look at the photo from epoxybot is that the windows are designed to tilt inwards at the top or open inwards. Both designed to stop things accidentally falling out of the window from an internal sill, but if left on vent by tilting inside will have fed flames and smoke into the flats very quickly, probably burning curtains etc.
The flats were simple concrete panel construction and many suffer badly from poor insulation, damp, condensation etc so adding external insulation is a decent way to upgrade the flats without loosing internal space which is small enough as it is. clearly it needs to be weather protected by something which doesn't burn.
The gap between the hard foam and the weather protection apparently prevents dampness penetrating the insulation but then causes issues with the flame speeding up behind the weather facing.
As for the gas I agree, but there's no evidence that anything was fitted to "auto shut off" as there wasn't anything to initiate it. No one has gas detectors other than your nose - gas is odourised and can be smelt at low concentrations. There is talk that the recent gas retrofit had not properly protected the main gas pipes in the service shaft and it clearly added to the fire, but only when everything was well alight.
Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.
Building regs have this issue about "cold spots" so there could easily be some sort of insulation around the window frames which melted in the heat allowing flames in. I've seen window frames "fixed" to the window holes by using expanding foam only in my time so how to prevent the window frames from failing needs to be considered.
Other point is that unlike the drawing, the reality if you look at the photo from epoxybot is that the windows are designed to tilt inwards at the top or open inwards. Both designed to stop things accidentally falling out of the window from an internal sill, but if left on vent by tilting inside will have fed flames and smoke into the flats very quickly, probably burning curtains etc.
The flats were simple concrete panel construction and many suffer badly from poor insulation, damp, condensation etc so adding external insulation is a decent way to upgrade the flats without loosing internal space which is small enough as it is. clearly it needs to be weather protected by something which doesn't burn.
The gap between the hard foam and the weather protection apparently prevents dampness penetrating the insulation but then causes issues with the flame speeding up behind the weather facing.
As for the gas I agree, but there's no evidence that anything was fitted to "auto shut off" as there wasn't anything to initiate it. No one has gas detectors other than your nose - gas is odourised and can be smelt at low concentrations. There is talk that the recent gas retrofit had not properly protected the main gas pipes in the service shaft and it clearly added to the fire, but only when everything was well alight.
Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.
Handful of pictures, including from inside the destroyed building:
picture 2, you see some windowframes tiltes inward (lower left corner), windowframes seem to still be in places
picture 2, you see some windowframes tiltes inward (lower left corner), windowframes seem to still be in places
stookeyfpe
Specifier/Regulator
Ingenuity said:
I have no knowledge of the UK Building Codes but I can assure you the design schematic you posted appears to have deviated from the ICC Evaluation Service report for the Reynobond ACM Rainscreen. See Section 4.4 of ICC ESR-345: This installation, in the US, would violate 2012 International Building Code Section 1407.
Given the age and occupancy of the building, the most economical solution is to retrofit sprinklers into these buildings. Based on the area of each dwelling/sleeping unit, it would provide a much higher level of fire protection and could be accomplished using CPVC piping.
from the CBC, "London police say that the number of dead or missing in aftermath of last week's fire at a highrise apartment tower is now 79.
Police Cmdr. Stuart Cundy gave the new figure during a statement outside Scotland Yard on Monday. The previous figure given was 58."
[added]jhardy1:
"I think it's probably a bit early to say "... the major contributor, without a doubt, is this ..." as there is still a lot of uncertainty and speculation about exactly what products (both cladding and insulation) were:"
From the movies taken, it was pretty obvious that the propagation of the fire was via the building envelope with some type of stack effect bringing the flame into the structure.
stookyfpe:
I don't have a handle on UK codes, but, I know that the flammable cladding is not permitted in Canada, and, I understand it is not permitted in the States.
The error is that the wrong material was used for the cladding. An architectural design error, at very least, or a substitution by the government, possibly with the blessing of the Architect.
Sprinklers may or may not have prevented the tragedy. The mayor of London is trying to deflect this by saying that the building type was old. This modern retrofit and the error in judgement by the professionals and regulators has cost nearly 80 lives. I'm being pretty harsh because a large number of people have, needlessly, been killed.
Dik
Police Cmdr. Stuart Cundy gave the new figure during a statement outside Scotland Yard on Monday. The previous figure given was 58."
[added]jhardy1:
"I think it's probably a bit early to say "... the major contributor, without a doubt, is this ..." as there is still a lot of uncertainty and speculation about exactly what products (both cladding and insulation) were:"
From the movies taken, it was pretty obvious that the propagation of the fire was via the building envelope with some type of stack effect bringing the flame into the structure.
stookyfpe:
I don't have a handle on UK codes, but, I know that the flammable cladding is not permitted in Canada, and, I understand it is not permitted in the States.
The error is that the wrong material was used for the cladding. An architectural design error, at very least, or a substitution by the government, possibly with the blessing of the Architect.
Sprinklers may or may not have prevented the tragedy. The mayor of London is trying to deflect this by saying that the building type was old. This modern retrofit and the error in judgement by the professionals and regulators has cost nearly 80 lives. I'm being pretty harsh because a large number of people have, needlessly, been killed.
Dik
stookeyfpe
Specifier/Regulator
dik said:
Based on other media reports it appears that the fire began in one of the units and the source of ignition was a malfunction in an electric refrigerator. Purely speculation on my part but if an electric appliance ignited and the fire grew to a point where other combustibles were involved, an automatic sprinkler system discharging at 0.1 GPM/Ft^2 based on NFPA 13 or NFPA 13R (R= residential) would have prevented the fire from reaching the flashover phase. I suspect when the fire reached flashover, the glazing failed, which vented the heated fire gases and direct flame impingement onto the improperly selected and installed MCM. When this occurred, the MCM inner layer (an expanded polystyrene) pyrolyzed, ignited, and the "$hit went South" as we say in my fire stations.
BrianPetersen
Mechanical
I'm no civil/building guy, but to me, in reading the ICC Evaluation Service report linked to a couple posts up, the installation of the combination of PIR foam and rainscreen panels was not even remotely similar to any of the recommended installation methods. Maybe I'm just reading the ICC document wrong, or maybe the drawing doesn't show required details.
It might have started with an electric refrigerator? The talk about building cladding is well and good, but I'm struggling with the electric issue.
I can understand if the wiring was damaged, and the refrigerator was out of a normal place (in lower housing that would not be a jump to believe).
But was their other electrical problems with the fuse box, or circuit breaker?
I am guessing that the electrical is 220V, 50Hz, but I don't have much else in details to go on. Is it delta, or wye?
I can understand if the wiring was damaged, and the refrigerator was out of a normal place (in lower housing that would not be a jump to believe).
But was their other electrical problems with the fuse box, or circuit breaker?
I am guessing that the electrical is 220V, 50Hz, but I don't have much else in details to go on. Is it delta, or wye?
cranky108,
400/230V earthed star, supplied as single phase 230V + neutral to each unit.
Plenty scope for an appliance fire to start in the right circumstances: even our smallest appliance fuse will allow over 700W continuously into a high impedance fault, and that will cause 'something' get damned hot quite quickly. In an older building there's no certainty that RCD / RCBO protection would be provided. An RCD is an GFCI in your patch of the world. If the wiring was original then the chances of RCD / RCBO protection are pretty small, and the protection for the appliance would be a fuselink of at least 3A and potentially as large as 13A if someone chose the wrong one for the application.
400/230V earthed star, supplied as single phase 230V + neutral to each unit.
Plenty scope for an appliance fire to start in the right circumstances: even our smallest appliance fuse will allow over 700W continuously into a high impedance fault, and that will cause 'something' get damned hot quite quickly. In an older building there's no certainty that RCD / RCBO protection would be provided. An RCD is an GFCI in your patch of the world. If the wiring was original then the chances of RCD / RCBO protection are pretty small, and the protection for the appliance would be a fuselink of at least 3A and potentially as large as 13A if someone chose the wrong one for the application.
stookeyfpe:
Looking at the films, the fire developed on the exterior prior to moving inward. It appears the roof is gone, and it may be that the elevator shaft and/or the stairwell created the stack. I don't know and this may come out. The exterior fire was sufficiently developed that when it moved to the interior the sprinklers may not have been effective; the consumables may likely have been outside the reach of the sprinklers. Sprinklers may have reduced the consumables and lowered the temperature a bit, but, I think most of the flame was on the outside out of reach from sprinklers. Hopefully a better understanding of the situation will evolve.
Should have added that if the initial fire was suppressed, then none of this would have happened... and in that manner, sprinklers would be great.
Dik
Looking at the films, the fire developed on the exterior prior to moving inward. It appears the roof is gone, and it may be that the elevator shaft and/or the stairwell created the stack. I don't know and this may come out. The exterior fire was sufficiently developed that when it moved to the interior the sprinklers may not have been effective; the consumables may likely have been outside the reach of the sprinklers. Sprinklers may have reduced the consumables and lowered the temperature a bit, but, I think most of the flame was on the outside out of reach from sprinklers. Hopefully a better understanding of the situation will evolve.
Should have added that if the initial fire was suppressed, then none of this would have happened... and in that manner, sprinklers would be great.
Dik
stookeyfpe
Specifier/Regulator
DIK,
I looked at the photos I've seen on-line and the elevation of the lowest undamaged floor is 4 stories abovegrade. It's difficult for me to understand why a person would want to intentionally ignite a fire in a building and attempt the act from the 4th floor at 12:54 AM London time. My scenario is more plausible and one media article confirms it started on the 4th floor. Based on 28 years in the US fire service working for a major metropolitan Fire Department in the Fire Marshal's Office causes me to believe this was a dwelling fire that breached the glazing and subsequently ignited the cladding.
I looked at the photos I've seen on-line and the elevation of the lowest undamaged floor is 4 stories abovegrade. It's difficult for me to understand why a person would want to intentionally ignite a fire in a building and attempt the act from the 4th floor at 12:54 AM London time. My scenario is more plausible and one media article confirms it started on the 4th floor. Based on 28 years in the US fire service working for a major metropolitan Fire Department in the Fire Marshal's Office causes me to believe this was a dwelling fire that breached the glazing and subsequently ignited the cladding.
EdStainless
Materials
dik, you can always try archive.org and look back at previously captured views of peoples web sites.
It is great for after and incident when you want to know what they were saying before it happened.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
P.E. Metallurgy, Plymouth Tube
It is great for after and incident when you want to know what they were saying before it happened.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
P.E. Metallurgy, Plymouth Tube
If that's pure speculation, I'd add a candle to the speculation. I cannot believe how many people think it's great to have one of those soot generating menaces running somewhere - often untended. The guy across the street's house has dark sooted ceilings in almost every room.
Keith Cress
kcress -
Not a newspaper I read, but has some close-up photos which those of you with understanding of building fires might be able to offer some opinion on:
Stookeyfpe: We'll have to see how this plays out... There's little doubt that this started as a dwelling fire on the 4th floor and the breach may have even been through an open window. It apparently started in an appliance(?) and the proximity of the appliance to the window or the location of any potential sprinkler heads may have an impact on whether sprinklers would have worked. I still have my doubts that they would have activated, but, we'll have to wait and see... all is speculation at this time predicated on relative experience...
Dik
Dik
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