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Tourist submersible visting the Titanic is missing 101

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David Pogue's interviews clarify some of his previous comments have been taken completely out of context and have been used to give the impression he was ever mocking the tech implementation on Titan.



Interview transcripts:

 
LionelHutz said:
So you think they took it apart before raising the pieces? I'm doubtful of that.

You clearly see how removing the window would have made that heavy end cap easier to move with the crane. Also maybe they were concerned about the window getting damaged during shipping so they moved it to it's own padded crate.
However, when I made my original post I thought that the bolts were going into the titanium end cap and I didn't see how they could have all ripped out without leaving a trace. Maybe if they were bolted to an inner retaining ring it could have bent and popped out leaving just a few scratches during the implosion. Or maybe the recovery crew removed the mangled parts of the ring that remained after the implosion.
 
I dont think the quality of the photos are good enough to be able tell if the screws snapped and are still in the end cap.
 
You clearly see how removing the window would have made that heavy end cap easier to move with the crane. Also maybe they were concerned about the window getting damaged during shipping so they moved it to it's own padded crate.

They used ROVs to recover the wreckage, so doubtful that they could have dismantled it in situ. Possibly done in transit, but it seems plausible that they would have used a different scheme to move it rather than risk damaging it and creating red herrings as to the damage sustained in the implosion vs. damage from dismantling it.

TTFN (ta ta for now)
I can do absolutely anything. I'm an expert! faq731-376 forum1529 Entire Forum list
 
"You may not be interested in mother nature, but mother nature is interested in you, and if you do not follow mother nature’s commands and respect her power, you will die."

The link provides perspective from an experienced Navy sub-mariner about the multiple failures in process that likely contributed to the tragedy.

 
​​​WASHINGTON (June 30, 2023) — The National Transportation Safety Board will investigate the loss of the Titan submersible and is part of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Marine Board of Investigation​. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for the investigation.

Investigation progress will most likely appear here: Coast Guard's Titan Submersible Marine Board of Investigation
 
I have just read Richard Feynman's minority report to the Space Shuttle Challenger Inquiry (as reproduced in the book "The Pleasure of Finding Things Out - The best short works of Richard Feynman").[ ] Its very first two paragraphs are:

It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of human life.[ ] The estimates range from roughly 1[ ]in[ ]100 to 1[ ]in 100,000.[ ] The higher figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures from management.[ ] What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement?[ ] Since 1[ ]part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years expecting to lose only one, we could properly ask "What is the cause of management's fantastic faith in the machinery?"

We have also found that certification criteria used in Flight Readiness Reviews often develop a gradually decreasing strictness.[ ] The argument that the same risk was flown before without failure is often accepted as an argument for the safety of accepting it again.[ ] Because of this, obvious weaknesses are accepted again and again, sometimes without a sufficiently serious attempt to remedy them, or to delay a flight because of their continued presence.


Then, a few paragraphs further down, comes Feynman's famous quote "When playing Russian roulette the fact that the first shot got off safely is little comfort for the next."

The relevance of this to the present tragedy can be summed up with yet another well known quote, but not a Feynman one this time.[ ] "It's like déjà vu all over again."


[sub][ ]—————————————————————————————————[/sub]
[sup]Engineering mathematician / analyst.[ ] See my profile for more details.
[/sup]

 
It appears to me, Stockton Rush was a working, hands-on engineer CEO and not an ivory-tower bean counter. As a working engineer and as a regular pilot of the Titan (and I will assume
many of OceanGate's other subs) he knew the risks involved with each dive/mission. He apparently either greatly misinterpreted the level of safety of the design or blindly ignored glaring red flags. I am hoping the final evidence does not show painfully and tragically Stockton Rush, though apparently a well degreed and experienced engineer (he flew around in an airplane he designed and built) embellished or possibly fabricated a body of testing that he used to convince himself of the safety of the CF hull design, and unfortunately also used to sell the safety of the sub to the clients of OceanGate. In the David Pogue interview transcripts Mr. Rush speaks of testing and analysis done by or in conjunction with Boeing, NASA, and University of Washington. If all he talked about was/is true then OceanGate should be able to present this for review and insight can be gained on how Stockton could have been so confident of the safety envelope of the hull design. Any deficiency of the OG analysis and interpretation could be found. But all three entities have stated they either did not work with OceanGate or in the case of UofW, the testing was on a single 1/3 scale model, not the actual Titan hull. Three denials seems ominous. OceanGate will either have a substantial body of testing that led to the confidence in the hull or this will be a case of Stockton Rush chasing a dream at all costs.
 
From what I can see of his work experience it would appear he had exceedingly little relevant work experience. He briefly worked for McDonnell Douglas as a flight-test engineer and a sonar manufacturer (dont know in what capacity). Then he got his MBA (this explains him doing things on the cheap) and became a venture capitalist for a while and ascended to C-suit. With his family's back ground and money I would expect he had a number of cushy opportunities he could choose from.
 
Though many very knowledgeable people have pointed out major issues with using CF for the pressure vessel, I don't think conclusive evidence is yet available that shows the CF hull was the primary failure point. I think the saying about assume still applies.
 
Well maybe strictly correct but as its the main component which appears to have disintegrated, the odd are rather high. IMHO.

I've had experience of dealing with inventors a bit like this and they simply cannot be told that their invention or revolutionary way of building something has major flaws or simply won't work.

They are generally very believable to the uninitiated and can twist anything you write to their advantage. Or they simply delete it.

In this case it has cost lives, but it will happen again somewhere else, my guess is one of these low orbit space rides will break up or blow up on take off.

Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.
 
Also I always liked and used Feynemans quote about "normalising failure". Every bang and creak was a failure of some sort. Might be inconsequential but cumulative. Once ignored first time or third time or thirtieth time, it will come back to ultimate failure.

Remember - More details = better answers
Also: If you get a response it's polite to respond to it.
 
The robust Feynmanesque attitude is that if your system no longer performs as expected (creaks, leaks) then you need to reanalyse your system from scratch.

Cheers

Greg Locock


New here? Try reading these, they might help FAQ731-376
 
'Normalization of failure' - wow, that is an appropriate title for a real and tangible gotcha! Risk gets trivalized with each successive use even though the true potential for harm and potential for occurrence have not changed. Worst case, the potential for occurrence could actually be increasing. . .
 
... or have got worse. Material state, like bad news, seldom improves with age.
 
Yes, zeusfaber I just edited my post with that realization! What slippery slope if Caution is not maintained.
 
I like Feynman but the "normalizing failure" bit is too often taken out of context by alarmists. Risk is relative. Unexpected noises and events should be investigated and risk severity and occurrence evaluated against a FMEA, but they're far from failures.
 
There are 3 possible causes at the present time. Major corners were cut in the design, construction and or testing in all 3 of these places.

1. The CF hull (Leading theory currently)
2. The epoxy joint between the CF hull and the titanium end caps
3. The view port window.

Also, since none of these items are visible in the wreckage, one of these failures is the cause of the implosion, and the other two failed as a result of it.
 

The interesting thing is that with Russian roulette, if you spin the cylinder each time... the previous result has absolutely nothing to do with the next one. If you don't spin it, there could be a whole different outcome.

-----*****-----
So strange to see the singularity approaching while the entire planet is rapidly turning into a hellscape. -John Coates

-Dik
 
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