I have just read Richard Feynman's minority report to the Space Shuttle Challenger Inquiry (as reproduced in the book "The Pleasure of Finding Things Out - The best short works of Richard Feynman").[ ] Its very first two paragraphs are:
It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of human life.[ ] The estimates range from roughly 1[ ]in[ ]100 to 1[ ]in 100,000.[ ] The higher figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures from management.[ ] What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement?[ ] Since 1[ ]part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years expecting to lose only one, we could properly ask "What is the cause of management's fantastic faith in the machinery?"
We have also found that certification criteria used in Flight Readiness Reviews often develop a gradually decreasing strictness.[ ] The argument that the same risk was flown before without failure is often accepted as an argument for the safety of accepting it again.[ ] Because of this, obvious weaknesses are accepted again and again, sometimes without a sufficiently serious attempt to remedy them, or to delay a flight because of their continued presence.
Then, a few paragraphs further down, comes Feynman's famous quote "When playing Russian roulette the fact that the first shot got off safely is little comfort for the next."
The relevance of this to the present tragedy can be summed up with yet another well known quote, but not a Feynman one this time.[ ] "It's like déjà vu all over again."
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Engineering mathematician / analyst.[ ] See my profile for more details.
